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"Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state and local
governments. 
1
On June 27, 2002, the United States Supreme Court held that all students
participating in extracurricular activities in public schools may be subjected to
random, suspicionless drug testing.2 The holding, in itself, is not terribly
remarkable, as the decision in Board of Education of LS.D. 92 of Pottawatomie
County, Oklahoma v. Earls3 follows a developing pattern among public schools
in this country.4 Further, the Earls case simply broadens the right of the state
to randomly drug test students, without individualized suspicion, that this same
court announced a mere seven years earlier in Vernonia v. Acton.5 What is
remarkable about Earls, and what may be disconcerting to those clinging to the
notion that students' rights entitle them to Fourth Amendment protection at
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I Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
2 Bd. of Educ. of I.S.D. No. 92 of Pottawatomie County, Okla. v. Earls, 122 S. Ct. 2559
(2002) (hereinafter "Earls"). Although the random, suspicionless drug testing involved in
the Earls case only applied to junior high/middle school and high school age students, the
broad language of the opinion did not delimit the propriety of testing to these categories.
Rather, as this article will suggest, the unmeasured language used by the majority in Earls
will permit public schools to possibly test all students - regardless of age - that desire to
participate in activities that are deemed "voluntary."
3 Id. (decided by a 5-4 majority of the United States Supreme Court on June 27, 2002).
4 See Part 1II, infra, and related discussion, referencing the numerous cases attempting to
delimit students' rights via drug testing.
5 Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995).
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school, is that Earls undoubtedly will be the necessary link between testing
those engaging in "voluntary" activities, as the athletes in Vernonia and the
Academic Team member in Earls, to the true target of such expansive suspi-
cionless testing policies: all public school students.6
Earls represents a problematic break with past application of the Fourth
Amendment in school cases.7 Earls goes beyond the holding in Acton by
broadening the application of the special needs doctrine to all students.8 The
justifications underlying Acton9 - safety in athletic competition and a demon-
strated drug problem among students athletes - were not present in Earls.'°
Rather, Earls breaks with precedent by allowing the liberalization of the "spe-
cial needs" doctrine in school cases and finding that drug use among American
teens and elementary students serves as an appropriate "special need" to sup-
port suspicionless drug testing.'" In this manner, Earls is not true to Acton and
ignores crucial policy justifications for dispensing with the Fourth Amendment
warrant and probable cause requirements that the Acton majority under-
scored.' 2 Likewise, Earls breaks with precedent in the special needs area by
allowing the global problem of drug use generally to provide ample basis for
the suspicionless drug testing of an identifiable group: elementary and secon-
dary public school students.1 3 Accordingly, Earls represents two problematic
departures from stare decisis.
In addition, the Earls case, written in seemingly limitless breadth, pro-
vides the requisite step between testing those involved in athletics and other
extracurricular activities and those in the general student population that we
fear, due to self-disclosed surveys or medical data, must be using illicit drugs. 4
For this reason, Earls single-handedly sounds the death knell of the assurance
that students do not shed their Constitutional rights at the school house gate. 5
6 See Oral Argument, Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 of Pottawatomie County v.
Earls, 122 S. Ct. 2559 (2002) (Paul D. Clement arguing on behalf of the United States as
amicus curiae, pages 25-26).
7 See T.L.O. v. N.J., 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
8 Acton, 515 U.S. 646.
9 See generally id.
10 Earls, 122 S. Ct. 2559.
" See generally id. See also infra Section III (discussing the limited nature of the special
needs doctrine - particularly as it provides justification for random, suspicionless drug
testing).
12 See generally Acton, 515 U.S. 646.
13 See generally infra Section III (explaining the application of the special needs doctrine).
14 Precisely what constitutes an illicit drug is not clear. The test administered in the
Oklahoma community at issue tests only for amphetamines, cannabinoid metabolites (mari-
juana), cocaine, opiates, barbiturates, and benzodiazepines, but ironically not for alcohol and
tobacco. Earls v. Bd. of Educ. of Tecumseh Pub. Sch. Dist., Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 of
Pottawatomie County, 242 F.3d 1264, 1267 (10th Cir. 2001). Further, in the annual "Safe
and Drug-Free School and Communities" application for funds, the Tecumseh schools
reported alcohol as the most problematic substance in the district. Id. at 1274.
15 Tinker v. Des Moines, 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969). This particular quote, first articulated
in Tinker, has been repeatedly misused and incorrectly cited by many. The actual quote,
delivered in a case involving First Amendment rights of free speech and expression, reads:
First Amendment rights, applied in light of the special circumstances of the school environment,
are available to teachers and students. It can hardly be argued that either students or teachers
shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the school house gate.
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Post- Earls, students absolutely shed their constitutional right to be free from
suspicionless searches regardless of whether the student's school has any
demonstrated drug problem and regardless of whether there is any demon-
strated safety or special need attendant to the search. 16 Thus, while the special
needs doctrine has consistently been limited to prevent full-scale devaluation of
the Fourth Amendment's warrant and probable cause requirements, Earls sug-
gests that students and youth fall outside this general limitation. 7 Neither
Acton's limited holding and requirement that a compelling drug or safety prob-
lem be actually present at the school nor the special needs doctrine requirement
for some specific demonstration of a special safety need as to a particular group
will delimit application of the Fourth Amendment at public schools after Earls.
With the resurrection and strengthening of the in loco parentis concept, the
Supreme Court has given license to schools to continue invading the personal
privacy of public school children to ensure that these wards are not using or
abusing illicit drugs - either on campus or in the privacy of their homes.
This article will trace the devolution of students' rights to privacy, pursu-
ant to the Fourth Amendment, beginning with T.L.O. v. New Jersey.1 8 Next,
the article will consider the elastic application of the court-created "special
needs" doctrine, particularly as applied in drug testing cases and in school set-
tings. In this section, the author will note the traditional requirements for appli-
cation of the "special needs" doctrine and distinguish the Supreme Court's
approach to "special needs" cases when the subjects are children. Finally, the
article will consider the recent application of the special needs doctrine in the
school setting by comparing the Vernonia and Earls opinions and project their
future application.
While at one time the Supreme Court assured society that "[t]he prisoner
and schoolchild stand in wholly different circumstances,"' 9 that pronounce-
ment is subject to challenge in both letter and spirit. Post-Vernonia, post-Col-
Id. (emphasis added). Courts and commentators alike have consistently omitted the phrase
"to freedom of speech or expression" in assuring students that they retain some of their
constitutional rights while at school. It would be most accurate, however, to observe that
students have lost the least amount of their purported rights in the area of First Amendment
jurisprudence, while the Fourth Amendment rights of students have been diminished with
increasing frequency and consistent fervor. Nonetheless, Justice Thomas, in his majority
opinion in Earls, again misuses the Tinker quotation to suggest that students' broad constitu-
tional rights are protected at school. Were the Tinker quote (as it is now regularly misused)
previously true in the broader constitutional context, a statement I find highly suspect in
relation to recent case authority, Earls certainly puts it to rest and should openly, rather than
tacitly, overrule it. Post-Earls, students absolutely shed their constitutional right to be free
from suspicionless searches for drugs as long as drugs remain a problem among our youth
and in our public schools. See infra notes 226-30 and accompanying text.
16 Compare Vemonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995), with Bd. of Educ. of
Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 of Pottawatomie County v. Earls, 122 S. Ct. 2559 (2002).
17 See generally Section III (discussing the special needs doctrine and recent cases limiting
its application to adults).
18 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
19 Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 669 (1977). Ingraham discussed, and ultimately dis-
missed, the applicability of the Eighth Amendment in the school setting. The case con-
fronted the issue of whether corporeal punishment via the paddling of students constituted
cruel and unusual punishment. In distinguishing prisoners from public schoolchildren, the
Court explained that "[t]he openness of the public school and its supervision by the commu-
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umbine, and now, post-Earls, schools have become a place where safety
concerns reign paramount to challenges against "zero tolerance" policies and
Fourth Amendment protections. Schools are increasingly becoming places
where police and state presence are both seen and felt.20 And while safety
concerns for students and teachers remain valid, we cannot, we must not, lose
sight of the pronouncement in Brown v. Board of Education, that "[tioday,
education [remains] perhaps the most important function of state and local gov-
ernments. '21 The lessons we teach our children - particularly those relating to
the protection of their rights in times of fear and crisis - will eventually have
broad consequences on our society.22 After all, we are today educating the
leaders of tomorrow.
II. THE BEGINNING OF THE END: T.L.O. v. NEW JERSEY
"In any realistic sense, students within the school environment have a lesser expecta-
tion of privacy than members of the population generally.",
2 3
It has widely been observed that children live what they learn.2 4 We
should not be so naive as to believe that our children do not realize the hypoc-
risy of the governing generation 25 when those in power refuse to tolerate
nity afford significant safeguards against the kinds of abuses from which the Eighth Amend-
ment protects the prisoner." Id. at 670.
20 Jason E. Yearout, Individualized School Searches and the Fourth Amendment: What's a
School District to Do?, 10 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 489, 512-13 (2002).
21 Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954) (emphasis added).
22 See Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 686 (1995) (O'Connor, J., dissent-
ing) (reminding that "[i]t cannot be too often stated that the greatest threats to our constitu-
tional freedoms come in times of crisis").
23 T.L.O. v. N.J., 469 U.S. 325, 348 (1985) (Powell, J., concurring). Justice Powell's con-
currence is very enlightening and, perhaps, foreshadows the current climate. In his concur-
ring opinion, Justice Powell reminds that "[t]he Court has balanced the interests of the
student against the school officials' need to maintain discipline by recognizing qualitative
differences between the constitutional remedies to which students and adults are entitled."
Id. at 349. In summarizing his brief opinion, Justice Powell unequivocally states:
The primary duty of school officials and teachers, as the Court states, is the education and train-
ing of young people. A State has a compelling interest in assuring that the schools meet this
responsibility. Without first establishing discipline and maintaining order, teachers cannot begin
to educate their students. And apart from education, the school has the obligation to protect
pupils from mistreatment by other children, and also to protect teachers themselves from vio-
lence by the few students whose conduct in recent years has prompted national concern. For me,
it would be at odds with history to argue that the full panoply of constitutional rules applies with
the same force and effect in the schoolhouse as it does in the enforcement of criminal laws.
Id. at 350.
24 In fact, there is a widely circulated poem entitled, "Children Learn What They Live," by
Dorothy Law Nolte. Certain lines from the poem are quite apropos to many of the lessons
implicit in the Earls case:
If children live with hostility, they learn to fight.
If children live with fear, they learn to be apprehensive.
If children live with tolerance, they learn patience.
If children live with fairness, they learn justice.
Id.
25 Judge Bork was denied his opportunity to sit on the U.S. Supreme Court for, among other
reasons, confessing to smoking marijuana. Likewise, former President Clinton responded to
allegations that he was observed smoking marijuana by assuring us that "he did not inhale."
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"youthful indiscretions" among today's children while simultaneously seeking
to justify and dismiss their own past failures on that basis. 26 Schools now
impose stringent, zero-tolerance regulations on their student bodies. And this
past term, the Supreme Court sided with school districts in upholding limits on
student rights in more cases than not.27 This leads many to believe that schools
are increasingly able to impose wide ranging regulations and intrusive policies
in the name of safety, order, and discipline. But, as we and perhaps even our
children know, it was not always so.
The first major departure from traditional Fourth Amendment28 analysis in
schools occurred in the 1985 case, T.L.O. v. New Jersey.29 At this first critical
juncture, the Court laid the foundation for Vernonia and Earls. In factual
terms, T.L.O. is a very simplistic case. A teacher at Piscataway High School in
New Jersey discovered two girls smoking in the ladies restroom.3 ° The teacher
escorted the students to the principal's office because smoking by students was
His remark has been oft repeated in sarcastic and disingenuous tones to refute allegations of
drug or alcohol use. Finally, former Vice-President Al Gore, Jr., has reportedly used mari-
juana during his lifetime. These examples are a few of the many instances where our leaders
- now reformed - must nonetheless convince us that the younger generation should not be
permitted to use or experiment with drugs and alcohol. See also Chandler v. Miller, 520
U.S. 305 (1997).
26 The current U.S. President, George W. Bush, discounted his prior driving while intoxi-
cated arrest as a "youthful indiscretion" during the 2000 presidential campaign, even though
the incident occurred when he was nearly thirty. How, then, can this generation of leaders
begin to impose harsh, zero-tolerance provisions on children when those now governing
used illicit drugs well into their young adulthood? One would certainly concede that the
successes of President Bush demonstrate that one can indeed commit "youthful indiscre-
tions" involving drugs and alcohol and later turn his or her life around without the drastic,
dire consequences that the governing generation now reference as inevitable.
27 See generally Owasso I.S.D. No. 1-011 v. Falvo, 534 U.S. 426 (2002) (unanimous hold-
ing that peer grading does not violate the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act, com-
monly referred to as FERPA) (decided February 19, 2002); Gonzaga University v. Doe, 536
U.S. 273 (2002) (holding FERPA's provisions do not create a personal right enforceable
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983) (decided June 20, 2002); and Taylor v. Simmons-Harris, 534 U.S.
1111 (finding that state-supported vouchers that may be redeemed to fund religious educa-
tion do not violate the First Amendment's Establishment Clause) (decided June 27, 2002).
28 The Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution reads in whole as follows:
Unreasonable searches and seizures.
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects, against unrea-
sonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon proba-
ble cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched,
and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. Co sT. amend. IV.
29 469 U.S. 325 (1985). T.L.O. was originally submitted to the Court on the limited issue of
whether the exclusionary rule applied to searches conducted in the school setting. Id. at 331.
After argument, the Court determined it more appropriate to decide the broader issue of
"what limits, if any, the Fourth Amendment places on the activities of school authorities."
Id. at 332. Because the Court resolved the case on the more broad issue, eventually deciding
that the Fourth Amendment did apply in the school setting and establishing a lower threshold
standard to support warrantless searches, the Court did not address the issue regarding the
application of the exclusionary rule. Id. at n.3.
30 Id. at 328. Terry Lynn Osborne, infamously known as "T.L.O.," was at the time a four-
teen year-old freshman. Id.
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prohibited.3 ' Once there, T.L.O. denied that she had been smoking or that she
smoked at all.32 The assistant vice principal asked T.L.O. into his office and
demanded inspection of her purse.33 While fumbling through T.L.O.'s purse,
the vice principal discovered a pack of cigarettes and a pack of cigarette rolling
papers, the latter of which is commonly associated with marijuana.3 4 Believing
that a closer inspection was warranted, the vice principal continued to examine
the purse.3 Upon further inspection the vice principal uncovered a trace
amount of marijuana, a pipe, a number of empty plastic bags, numerous one
dollar bills, and an apparent itemization of students owing T.L.O. money.36
The school notified T.L.O.'s mother of the offense and turned all evidence over
to the police.37 T.L.O. ultimately confessed to selling marijuana and was
processed by the state as a delinquent. 38 During the delinquency proceedings,
T.L.O. challenged the search of her purse by the Vice Principal as unlawful.39
In resolving this controversy, the United States Supreme Court laid the corner-
stone to Earls.
T.L.O. is important, from a legal perspective, for three crucial holdings.
First, the Court expressly noted that the Fourth Amendment's "prohibition on
unreasonable searches and seizures applies to searches conducted by public
school officials." 40 This finding is important because it ensures that students
will not, in theory, be subjected to any search that is unreasonable at the hands
of their teachers and principals.4 "
The second major holding that stems from T.L.O. is that the warrant
requirement typically mandated by the Fourth Amendment is not always neces-
sary in the school setting.4 2 This finding was palatable in T.L.O. because
schools, like police, may confront exigencies that justify immediate warrantless
searches. The T.L.O. Court expressly noted that "[t]he warrant requirement...
is unsuited to the school environment: requiring a teacher to obtain a warrant
before searching a child suspected of an infraction of school rules (or of the








38 Id. at 329.
39 Id.
40 Id. at 333. As noted above, the case was argued twice. Initially, the Court granted certio-
rari to decide whether the exclusionary rule applied in school settings where the challenged
search was conducted by a school official rather than a traditional peace officer. Id. at 332.
Thereafter, the Court ordered reargument on the question of what limits, if any, the Fourth
Amendment imposes upon school officials within the school setting. Id.
41 Id. at 334 (briefly noting the axiomatic principle that school officials are state actors
pursuant to the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment).
42 Id. at 340. The Court justifies its decision regarding the warrant requirement as follows:
How, then, should we strike the balance between the schoolchild's legitimate expectations of
privacy and the school's equally legitimate need to maintain an environment in which learning
can take place? It is evident that the school setting requires some easing of the restrictions to
which searches by public authorities are ordinarily subject.
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informal disciplinary procedures needed in the school."4 3 The problem with
dispensing the warrant requirement under such a broad principle is that it
enables the school district to act as a law enforcement agency as well as an
educator. However, the school district as a law enforcement agency is not
bound by the strictures of the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement.'
Although school officials may conduct warrantless searches when it is feared
that a school rule or the criminal law has been violated, the exigency of circum-
stances mandating the search will no longer be evaluated. In short, T.L.O. per-
mits school officials to do precisely what peace officers cannot under the
strictures of the Fourth Amendment: dispense with securing a warrant in all
cases due solely to the situs of the alleged offense.
The third critical holding in T.L.O. is the delineation of what constitutes a
"reasonable" search by a school official. In many respects, the Court simply
drew from past experience in creating a two-part balancing test.45 Noting that
many prior cases dispense with the probable cause requirement, the Court
accepted a much lower standard of "cause" required to initiate a search in the
school setting.4 6 Henceforth,
The legality of a search of a student should depend simply on the reasonableness,
under all the circumstances, of the search. Determining the reasonableness of any
search involves a two-fold inquiry: first, one must consider "whether the ... action
was justified at its inception"; second, one must determine whether the search as
actually conducted "was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justi-
fied the interference in the first place." Under ordinary circumstances, a search of a
student by a teacher or other school official will be "justified at its inception" when
there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that the student has violated or is violat-
ing either the law or the rules of the school. Such a search will be permissible in its
scope when the measures adopted are reasonably related to the objectives of the
search and are not excessively intrusive in light of the age and sex of the student and
the nature of the infraction.
4 7
The essential holding of T.L.O. is that, due to the unique nature of the
school setting, teachers and school officials may initiate searches on students
without first obtaining a warrant if they have reasonable suspicion that the stu-
dent has violated a school rule or criminal law.4 1 When testing the "reasona-
bleness" of the search pursuant to the Fourth Amendment, such warrantless
searches will be upheld as valid where the search was justified at its inception
(i.e., the teacher or school official had individualized suspicion that this student
had committed a particular violation of school rules or law) and was reasonable
3 Id. (emphasis added).
44 Not only did T.L.O. find herself in trouble at school, but the evidence uncovered by the
Vice Principal later served as the basis for adjudicating T.L.O. a delinquent in the criminal
arena. Thus, although the search was initially seeking only evidence of cigarette smoking,
which violated a school rule, the more serious items uncovered in T.L.O.'s purse were later
used against her in a court of law.
45 T.L.O. v. N.J., 469 U.S. 325, 341-42 (1985) (referencing the familiar Terry v. Ohio "stop
and frisk" standard). See generally Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
46 Id. at 341 (observing that "we have in a number of cases recognized the legality of
searches and seizures based on suspicions that, although 'reasonable,' do not rise to the level
of probable cause") (citations omitted).
47 Id. at 341-42 (internal citations to Terry v. Ohio omitted).
48 See supra notes 32-40 and accompanying text.
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in its scope (i.e., that the search is consistent with the evidence sought or found
and does not unduly infringe on the rights of a student based on age and gen-
der).49 Thus, T.L.O. kept in place one of the most closely guarded protections
of the Fourth Amendment: the concept of individualized suspicion.
And while these three crucial points are what most individuals mention
when citing T.L.O., the concurring opinion of Justice Blackmun unwittingly,
perhaps, carved out an entirely new exception to the Fourth Amendment that
ushered in a new genre of cases. In commenting on the lowered standard of
suspicion required for school searches, Justice Blackmun penned the outline
that would later serve as foundation for the "special needs" doctrine:
The Court correctly states that we have recognized limited exceptions to the proba-
ble-cause requirement "[w]here a careful balancing of governmental and private
interests suggests that the public interest is best served" by a lesser standard. I
believe that we have used such a balancing test, rather than strictly applying the
Fourth Amendment's Warrant and Probable-Cause-Clause, only when we were con-
fronted with "a special law enforcement need for greater flexibility." . . . Only in
those exceptional circumstances in which special needs, beyond the normal need for
law enforcement, make the warrant and probable-cause requirement impracticable,
is a court entitled to substitute its balancing of interests for that of the Framers.50
Justice Blackmun probably never intended this language to serve as the
impetus for creating a new breed of Fourth Amendment cases - the "special
needs" cases. This can be discerned from the remainder of Justice Blackmun's
concurring opinion, which limits the balancing test applied in T.L.O. to the
facts of the case.5 1 Rather, Justice Blackmun noted the importance of dispens-
ing with the traditional warrant and probable cause requirements at school
where either the safety of the students or the sanctity of the educational process
was challenged.52
Similarly, Justice Brennan and Justice Stevens seek, in their respective
dissenting opinions, to limit the ability of the state to conduct warrantless
searches on students based on something less than probable cause. 53 In cau-
tioning for restraint, Justice Stevens characterizes schools as "places where we
inculcate the values essential to the meaningful exercise of rights and responsi-
bilities by a self-governing citizenry."5 4 To ignore this fact would be tanta-
mount to ignoring that children live what they learn. "If the Nation's students
can be convicted [of a crime] through the use of arbitrary methods destructive
of personal liberty, they cannot help but feel that they have been dealt with
unfairly."5 5
Unlike the T.L.O. opinion, which still mandates reasonable suspicion
when searching students for evidence of a school violation or violation of the
49 See supra notes 32-40 and accompanying text.
50 T.L.O. v. N.J., 469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985) (Blackmun, J., concurring in judgment) (empha-
sis added) (internal citations omitted).
51 Id. at 352-54 (Blackmun, J., concurring in judgment).
52 Id. at 353 (Blackmun, J., concurring in judgment).
13 See generally id. at 353-70 (Brennan, J., dissenting); id. at 370-85 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
54 Id. at 373 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
55 Id. at 373-74 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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law,56 Vernonia and Earls eliminate the requirement for such individualized
suspicion where the alleged need is to deter drug use by the student popula-
tion.57 Yet, one can hardly believe that the drafters of the Fourth Amendment
envisioned that not only the warrant and probable cause requirements, but any
individualized suspicion requirements, would be discarded upon finding a suffi-
cient "need." For it was the fear of such vacillating "special needs" that drove
our Founders to revolt and provided the impetus behind their efforts to secure
our Bill of Rights.58 But, of course, the warrant and probable cause require-
ments were not easily discarded; they, like the requirement of individualized
suspicion, fell away gradually as we slid further down the slippery slope from
T.LO. to Earls.
III. THE SPECIAL NEEDS DOCTRINE: COURT CREATED, ILL-DEFINED
"Only in those exceptional circumstances in which special needs, beyond the normal
need for law enforcement, make the warrant and probable-cause requirement
impracticable, is a court entitled to substitute its balancing of interests for those of
the Framers. "
59
Eventually, the state realized the burdensome nature of the Fourth Amend-
ment constraints and sought to justify various searches without fully complying
with the constitutional requirements. 60 This line of cases, beginning with
T.L.O. v. New Jersey,6 1 established the "special needs" exception to the Fourth
Amendment. Where the need is great enough, usually because the danger is
immediate and the potential consequences grave enough, the warrant and prob-
able cause requirement of the Fourth Amendment, which largely translate to
individualized suspicion, may be ignored.
"The 'special needs' doctrine, which has been used to uphold certain sus-
picionless searches performed for reasons unrelated to law enforcement, is an
exception to the general rule that a search must be based on individualized
56 See supra notes 42-45 and accompanying text.
" See infra Section C, discussing in detail both Vernonia and Earls.
58 We should certainly not forget that the Founders placed a Preamble in the U.S. Constitu-
tion that attempted to "secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our posterity."
59 T.L.O. v. N.J., 469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985) (Blackmun, J., concurring). This quote reap-
pears in the majority opinion in most all of the special needs cases. Each of these opinions
attribute the creation of the "special needs" doctrine to Justice Blackmun in the T.L.O. case.
I A strict or literal interpretation of the Fourth Amendment would permit no exceptions to
the warrant and probable cause requirements. The Fourth Amendment, unlike others in the
Bill of Rights, does not, by its own terms, limit application of the freedom to be free from
unreasonable searches and seizures to the criminal arena. See generally, Skinner v. Ry.
Labor Executives Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 640 (1989) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (observing that
"[bly its terms... the Fourth Amendment - unlike the Fifth and Sixth - does not confine its
protections to either criminal or civil actions. Instead, it protects generally '[t]he right of the
people to be secure.'").
61 Id. As Justice Blackmun authored only a concurring opinion, there is no question but that
his quote was, at least at this time, mere dicta. Since 1985, however, many majority opin-
ions have incorporated the "special needs" doctrine, first set forth as dicta, into the main
opinion of the Court and have collectively established an exception to traditional Fourth
Amendment analysis. The Court will permit governmental bodies to ignore the warrant and
probable cause requirement when some "special need" beyond ordinary law enforcement
presents itself. See infra notes 62-72 and accompanying text.
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suspicion of wrongdoing. ' 62 Accordingly, the cases entitling the state to con-
duct suspicionless searches are very limited and can generally be separated into
four distinct situations: (1) administrative searches; 63 (2) fixed motorist check-
point searches; 64 (3) searches implicating physical harm or safety threats
against the general public; 65 and (4) searches conducted in the school setting.66
Justice Marshall has noted that the court-created "special needs" doctrine has
now come to "displace [the] constitutional text in each of the four categories of
searches enumerated in the Fourth Amendment" 67 - searches of persons,
6 8
houses, 69 papers7 ° and effects.7" In the special needs line of cases, the Court's
substitution of the special needs balancing test for the requirement of probable
cause has been inconsistent, and now, with the decision in Earls, provides
62 City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 54 (2000) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
But see Griffin v. Wis., 483 U.S. at 873-76 (permitting the warrantless search of a proba-
tioner's home by law enforcement personnel due to the probationer's probationary status
where, by the very terms of probation and the constant monitoring that probation requires, he
was believed to have a lower expectation of privacy).
63 See Camera v. Mun. Court of City and County of S.F., 387 U.S. 523 (1967) (a pre-T.L.O.
case permitting the warrantless administrative search of building to ensure compliance with
San Francisco housing code regulations); Mich. v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499 (1978) (pre-T.L.O.
case allowing warrantless administrative search of fire-damaged premises); N.Y. v. Burger,
482 U.S. 691 (1987) (upholding warrantless administrative search of a business considered
by the Court to be highly regulated).
I See United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976) (pre-T.L.O. decision permit-
ting the suspicionless stop of vehicles at fixed points close to the border to protect against
illegal immigrants); Del. v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979) (pre-T.L.O. decision suggesting that
fixed motorist search checking licenses and vehicle registration would be constitutional);
Mich. Dept. of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990) (upholding fixed sobriety check-
points to protect the public against the dangers of drunk drivers). But see City of Indianapo-
lis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32 (2000) (striking down as unconstitutional a City ordinance that
established fixed motorist checkpoints to search for illegal drugs).
65 See Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989); Treasury Employees v.
Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989). In both cases, there was a threat of harm or injury to
persons other than the individual who might be using or abusing alcohol and drugs while on
the job. This limited application of the "special needs" doctrine did not go unnoticed by the
dissenters in Vernonia. Justice O'Connor, writing for the dissent, distinguished Skinner and
Von Raab by noting that "an individualized suspicion requirement was often impractical in
these cases because they involved situations in which even one undetected instance of
wrongdoing could have injurious consequences for a great number of people." Veronia
Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 675-76 (1995) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citations
omitted). But see Ferguson v. City of Indianapolis, 532 U.S. 67 (2001) (holding a state
hospital's mandatory drug testing program for pregnant women unconstitutional despite the
importance of curtailing drug use among expectant mothers).
66 See T.L.O. v. N.J., 469 U.S. 325 (1985); Acton, 515 U.S. 646; Bd. of Educ. of Indep.
Sch. Dist. No. 92 of Pottawatomie County v. Earls, 122 S. Ct. 2559 (2002). In addition,
several state and lower federal courts have utilized the special needs doctrine to justify dis-
carding the pure Fourth Amendment requirements of individualized suspicion in the school
setting.
67 Skinner, 489 U.S. at 636-37 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
68 Skinner, 489 U.S. 602.
69 Griffin v. Wis., 483 U.S. 868 (1987).
70 O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709 (1987).
71 T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325.
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seemingly disparate treatment between adults and children - even in relation to
the national drug crisis.
7 2
A. The Non-School Drug Testing Cases
"In widening the 'special needs' exception to probable cause to authorize searches of
the human body unsupported by ANY evidence of wrongdoing, the majority today
completes the process begun in T.L.O. of eliminating altogether the probable-cause
requirement for civil searches - those undertaken for reasons 'beyond the normal
need for law enforcement.'
73
Although TL.O. is credited with the creation of the "special needs" doc-
trine,"4 this exception to the warrant and probable cause requirement has been
more frequently applied in non-school cases. The first application of the "spe-
cial needs" exception to warrantless, suspicionless drug testing appeared in a
1989 constitutional challenge to the suspicionless drug testing of railroad
employees involved in certain railway accidents.7 ' The precipitating factor
necessitating mandatory suspicionless drug testing was evidence of on-the-job
intoxication that contributed to railroad accidents with fatalities and significant
property loss. 76 Thus, in response to growing concern that the railroad industry
was unable to deter drug use among its employees, the Federal Railroad
Administration implemented a program mandating drug testing7 7 on all
employees involved in incidents defined as either a "major train accident,, 78 an
72 The Court has decided four drug testing search cases within the past six terms. In the first
three cases, all involving attempted searches against adults, the Court struck down the
searches involved as beyond the reach of the "special needs" exception to the Fourth
Amendment. Compare, Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305 (1997); City of Indianapolis v.
Edmond, 531 U.S. 32 (2000); Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67 (2001). These
three cases certainly conflate the "special needs" doctrine as applied to drug testing gener-
ally. Only in the most recent decision, Earls, did a majority of the Court find that suspi-
cionless drug testing falls within the "special needs" doctrine. This holding can be explained
either by recognizing the distinction in treatment between the rights of adults and the rights
of schoolchildren or by delineating those cases where the primary purpose of the search is to
deter drug use versus those conducted to further criminal law enforcement. But see Chan-
dler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305 (1997) (where the need to deter drug use among our leaders,
those voluntarily running for political office, was not sufficient to permit testing of political
candidates who are our legal representatives and societal role models).
" Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 640 (1989) (Marshall, J., dissent-
ing) (emphasis in original).
74 T.L.O. v. N.J., 469 U.S. 325 (1985) (describing the dicta in Justice Blackmun's concur-
ring opinion regarding "special needs" in the T.L.O. case). See also Ferguson v. City of
Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 76 n.7 (2001) (crediting Justice Blackmun with the balancing test
applied in subsequent "special needs" cases).
75 Skinner, 489 U.S. at 606-10 (describing the Federal Railroad Administration's regula-
tions in response to data indicating that numerous railway accidents had involved alcohol or
drug impairment).
76 Id. at 606-07 (noting that "[t]he problem of alcohol use on American railroads is as old as
the industry itself").
77 The Federal Railroad Administration's regulations required blood, urine, and
breathalyzer testing to discern the presence of drugs or alcohol in an employee's system. Id.
at 609-12.
78 Id. at 609 (defining a "major train accident" as any accident involving a fatality, the
release of hazardous materials, or causing at least $500,000 in railroad property damage).
NEVADA LAW JOURNAL
"impact accident,"79 or any incident resulting in a fatality to an on-duty railroad
employee.8° The Railway Labor Executives Association and members of the
organization challenged the propriety of the suspicionless drug testing and
alleged that such testing ran contrary to the protections enshrined in the Fourth
Amendment.
Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, noted very quickly that individ-
uals have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their bodily fluids, particularly
their blood, breath, and urine.8 ' In reaching his conclusion, Justice Kennedy
noted that the "chemical analysis of urine, unlike that of blood, can reveal a
host of private medical facts about an employee, including whether he or she is
epileptic, pregnant or diabetic."'82 The Court further noted that "the process of
collecting the sample to be tested, which may in some cases involve visual or
aural monitoring of the act of urination, itself implicates privacy interests. 83
In following the unanimous holding of all federal appellate courts at the time,
the Court found that "the collection and testing of urine intrudes upon expecta-
tions of privacy that society has long recognized as reasonable, ' 84 and, there-
fore, invokes protection under the Fourth Amendment.85
Under the "special needs" doctrine, the Court was then required to balance
the privacy interests of the individual against the countervailing interests of the
79 Id. (defining an "impact accident" as a collision resulting in a reportable injury or more
than $50,000 damage to railroad property).
80 Id.
" Id. at 616-18. See also, Schmerber v. Cal., 384 U.S. 757, 769-70 (1966) (in this case
involving the warrantless, unconsented withdrawal of blood by hospital employees at the
behest of law enforcement, the Court noted that "[t]he interests in human dignity and privacy
which the Fourth Amendment protects forbid any such intrusions on the mere chance that
desired evidence might be obtained. In the absence of a clear indication that in fact such
evidence will be found, these fundamental human interests require law officers to suffer the
risk that such evidence may disappear unless there is an immediate search."); Rochin v. Cal.,
342 U.S. 165 (1952) (due process challenge to the warrantless, unconsented pumping of an
individual's stomach because the suspect had allegedly swallowed morphine).
82 Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 617 (1989).
83 Id.
84 Id. The Court quoted a paragraph from the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals decision in
Nat'l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, the companion case to Skinner. This quote
has appeared subsequently in other opinions detailing the very intimate nature of urination
and the composition of urine. The passage reads as follows:
There are few activities in our society more personal or private than the passing of urine. Most
people describe it by euphemisms if they talk about it at all. It is a function traditionally per-
formed without public observation; indeed, its performance in public is generally prohibited by
law as well as social customs.
Id., quoting Nat'l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 816 F.2d 170 (5th Cir. 1987).
85 Skinner, 489 U.S. at 619 (stating that "the Fourth Amendment does not proscribe all
searches and seizures, but only those that are unreasonable"). See also Schmerber, 384 U.S.
at 768. The Court stated that, in a warrantless blood testing case,
the Fourth Amendment's proper function is to constrain, not against all intrusions as such, but
against intrusions which are not justified in the circumstances, or which are made in an improper
manner. In other words, the questions we must decide in this case are whether the police were
justified in requiring petitioner to submit to the blood test, and whether the means and procedures
employed in taking his blood respected the relevant Fourth Amendment standard of
reasonableness.
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government in conducting the search. 86 The Skinner Court determined that a
railroad employee will naturally have a lessened expectation of privacy due to
his or her participation in a highly-regulated industry. 87 Thus, in evaluating the
"reasonableness" of a search pursuant to the Fourth Amendment and the court-
created "special needs" doctrine, a court is now able to consider an individual's
expectation of privacy under the unique circumstances of the individual - not
just in relation to society at large.8 8 This malleable approach toward Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence certainly could not have been foreseen by the Foun-
ders. Yet, this evolving approach provided a sufficient harbinger for the stu-
dents in both Vernonia and Earls.
In contrast to the limited expectations of privacy by those employees in a
highly regulated industry, the Court considered the government's interest in
deterring drug use by those engaged in safety-sensitive tasks to be "compel-
ling."' 89 The Court observed:
The possession of unlawful drugs is a criminal offense, that the Government may
punish, but it is a separate and far more dangerous to perform certain sensitive tasks
while under the influence of those substances. Performing those tasks while
impaired by alcohol is, of course, equally dangerous, though consumption of alcohol
is legal in most other contexts. The Government may take all necessary and reasona-
ble regulatory steps to prevent or deter that hazardous conduct, and since the grava-
men of the evil is performing certain functions while concealing the substances in the
body, it may be necessary, as in the case before us, to examine the body or its fluids
to accomplish the regulatory purpose. The necessity to perform that regulatory func-
tion with respect to railroad employees engaged in safety-sensitive tasks, and the
reasonableness of the system for doing so, have been established in this case.
90
Accordingly, the Court upheld the mandatory, suspicionless drug testing
of railroad employees who were involved in certain designated accidents. Jus-
tice Stevens, in a concurring opinion, noted that he was not "persuaded, how-
ever, that the interest in deterring the use of alcohol or drugs is either necessary
or sufficient to justify the searches authorized by these regulations." 9 1
On the same day that Skinner was decided, the Court handed down a com-
panion case, National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab .9 Much like
the facts of Skinner, Von Raab involved a challenge to mandatory, suspi-
cionless drug testing of applicants for promotion at the United States Customs
Service in positions involving either the use of a firearm or the interdiction of
86 This so called "balancing test" has not been consistently applied. At times, the Court first
determines whether a "special need" appears and then proceeds to conduct the balancing test.
At other times, the Court will assess whether a "special need" arises by conducting a balanc-
ing test. See e.g., supra note 23 and accompanying text.
87 Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 627 (1989) (noting that "the expec-
tations of privacy of covered employees are diminished by reason of their participation in an
industry that is regulated pervasively to ensure safety, a goal dependent, in substantial part,
on the health and fitness of covered employees").
88 See generally Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
89 Skinner, 489 U.S. at 628-30.
90 Id. at 633.
91 Id. at 634. Justice Stevens's reluctance toward relaxing the warrant and probable cause
requirements in suspicionless drug testing cases would recur, and be echoed by other mem-
bers of the court, many years later in Vernonia and Earls.
92 489 U.S. 656 (1989).
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illegal drugs.9 3 As in Skinner, the results of a positive test were not turned over
to law enforcement or any other agency.9 4 The consequence of a positive test,
if the employee could proffer no suitable explanation for the result, was
dismissal. 95
Justice Kennedy, again writing for the majority, reminded that the Court's
holding in Skinner:
reaffirms the longstanding principle that neither a warrant nor probable cause, nor,
indeed, any measure of individualized suspicion, is an indispensable component of
reasonableness in every circumstance. As we note in Railway Labor Executives, our
cases establish that where a Fourth Amendment intrusion serves special needs,
beyond the normal need for law enforcement, it is necessary to balance the individ-
ual's privacy expectations against the Government's interests to determine whether it
is impractical to require a warrant or some level of individualized suspicion in the
particular context.
96
The Court held that the search in question did not violate the Fourth
Amendment because Customs Agents are our first line of defense in safeguard-
ing our borders and interdicting illegal drugs.97
In many respects, after Skinner, the decision in Von Raab was not surpris-
ing. The one remarkable component, however, is Justice Scalia's strongly
worded dissent. Noting the complete lack of evidence of drug or alcohol
problems in the Customs Service, Justice Scalia refused to sign on to the major-
ity's opinion.98 Three distinct paragraphs written over four pages suggest that
Justice Scalia would not permit suspicionless drug testing in the absence of
credible evidence that a drug problem exists, supporting the dispensation of the
Fourth Amendment's literal warrant and probable cause requirements. 99
93 Id. at 659-63.
94 Id. at 663.
95 Id.
96 Id. at 665-66.
" Id. at 677 (as in Skinner, Justice Kennedy termed the government's interest "compel-
ling"). The Court only upheld the drug testing program against those who are responsible
for searching for narcotics and illegal drugs and those required to carry firearms. The Court
did not uphold suspicionless drug testing against those dealing with "classified" documents
and, instead, remanded this portion of the decision back to the lower court for clarification.
Id. at 679.
9' Id. at 680-81 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
99 Id. at 680-84 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Given Justice Scalia's seeming change in heart later
in the Earls case, it is important to set forth these paragraphs in full text. Had Justice Scalia
remained convinced that evidence of a prior drug problem was a prerequisite to suspi-
cionless drug testing, the Earls decision would have come down 5-4 in favor of the student -
not the school. Ultimately, it is the majority's stance that carried the day and won over even
Justice Scalia when addressing alleged drug use in our public schools.
In distinguishing his dissenting opinion in Von Raab from his earlier vote to join the
majority in Skinner, Justice Scalia wrote:
Today, in Skinner, we allow a less intrusive bodily search of railroad employees involved in train
accidents. I joined the Court's opinion there because the demonstrated frequency of drug and
alcohol use by the targeted class of employees, and the demonstrated connection between such
use and grave harm, rendered the search a reasonable means of protecting society. I decline to
join Court's opinion in the present case because neither frequency of use nor connection to harm
is demonstrated or even likely. In my view the Customs Service rules are a kind of immolation
of privacy and human dignity in symbolic opposition to drug use.
Treasury Employees v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 680-81 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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B. Recent Deviations: The Court Pulls Back
In 1997, the Court pulled back from its "special needs" application to drug
testing cases generally. Chandler v. Miller' ° provided the Court an opportu-
nity to consider whether the holdings of Skinner and Von Raab should be
extended to candidates for state office.'O° In 1993, the state of Georgia passed
a statute requiring candidates for certain public offices 10 2 to submit to a drug
test in order to qualify for a place on the ballot. '0 3 Justice Ginsburg, writing for
the majority, discussed the previous three drug testing cases, Skinner, Von
Raab and Vernonia, in determining first, whether any "special need" existed to
support the test.'0 4 Justice Ginsburg found that prior "precedents establish that
the proffered special need for drug testing must be substantial - important
enough to override the individual's acknowledged privacy interest, and suffi-
ciently vital to suppress the Fourth Amendment's normal requirement of indi-
vidualized suspicion."' 5 As there was no evidence of drug use among the
selected class, the Court was unable to find that a special need existed. 106
Much like Justice Scalia before her, Justice Ginsburg described the Georgia
Later in the same opinion, Justice Scalia further distinguished his stance in Von Raab
from his decision in Skinner by noting as follows:
What is absent in the Government's justifications - notably absent, revealingly absent, and as far
as I am concerned dispositively absent - is the recitation of even a single instance in which any
of the speculated horribles actually occurred: an instance, that is, in which the cause of bribe-
taking, or of poor aim, or of unsympathetic law enforcement, or of compromise of classified
information, was drug use.
Id. at 683 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
Finally, Justice Scalia explains that generalized drug use or speculative needs will not
suffice to justify departure from traditional Fourth Amendment requirements in most case.
He writes:
But if such a generalization suffices to justify demeaning bodily searches, without particularized
suspicion, to guard against the bribing or blackmailing of a law enforcement agent, or the care-
less use of a firearm, then the Fourth Amendment has become frail protection indeed. In Skin-
ner, Bell, T.L.O., and Martinez-Fuerte, we took pains to establish the existence of special need
for the search or seizure - a need based not upon the existence of a "pervasive social problem"
combined with the speculation as to the effect of that problem in the field at issue, but rather
upon well-known and well-demonstrated evils in that field, with well-known or well-demon-
strated consequences.
Id. at 684 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
to 520 U.S. 305 (1997).
lo Id. at 308-10.
112 The only offices requiring drug tests were the Governor, Lieutenant Governor, Secretary
of State, Attorney General, State School Superintendent, Commission of Insurance, Com-
missioner of Agriculture, Commissioner of Labor, Justices of the Supreme Court, Judges of
the Court of Appeals, judges of the superior courts, district attorneys, members of the Gen-
eral Assembly, and members of the Public Services Commission. Id. at 309-310 (citing GA.
CODE. ANN. sec. 21-2-140(a)(4)).
103 Id. at 308-10 (explaining that potential candidates must submit to the drug test and cer-
tify that their test was negative).
104 Id. at 314-19.
105 Id. at 318.
106 Id. at 318-19 ("Notably lacking in respondents' presentation is any indication of a con-
crete danger demanding departure from the Fourth Amendment's main rule" requiring indi-
vidualized suspicion.).
NEVADA LAW JOURNAL
plan as largely symbolic."°7 Finding the absence of a "special need" due to the
lack of any evidence supporting drug use or safety issues, the Court did not
even conduct a balancing test of the interests between individual privacy and
governmental need. t0 8 Simply put, suspicionless drug testing of adults, the
ones who voluntarily submit themselves to public scrutiny through the electoral
process, runs counter to the Fourth Amendment.
Justice Rehnquist was the only dissenting voice in Chandler.t°9 Justice
Rehnquist was quick to point out the irony in the majority's opinion, noting that
"the Court perversely relies on the fact that a candidate for office gives up so
much privacy . . . as a reason for sustaining a Fourth Amendment claim.""'
Because candidates are subject to constant public scrutiny, the majority rea-
sons, "their candidacy will enable people to detect any drug use on their
part."'1 1 Relying on the prevalence of drug use in society, the "negligible pri-
vacy concerns implicated by urinalysis drug testing and the vulnerability of
public officials to bribery and blackmail," Justice Rehnquist was willing to
uphold the Georgia statute against challenge." 2 In the next two drug testing
cases, two more voices would join his dissent.
In 1998, Indianapolis began implementing suspicionless vehicle check-
points in an effort to combat narcotic use.' 13 The checkpoints were placed in
predetermined locations based on crime in the area and traffic flow. 1 1 4 The
average traffic stop initiated pursuant to the policy lasted just a few minutes. "
During the warrantless vehicular stops, officers looked for signs of impairment
and visually checked the car while a trained narcotics dog walked around each
vehicle." 6 Two individuals challenged the suspicionless checkpoints under the
Fourth Amendment." 17 This challenge culminated in the second deviation from
107 Id. at 322 (stating that "[h]owever well meant, the candidate drug test Georgia has
devised diminishes personal privacy for a symbol's sake").
108 Id. at 323. Justice Ginsburg concluded her opinion as follows:
We reiterate, too, that where the risk to public safety is substantial and real, blanket suspicionless
searches calibrated to the risk may rank as "reasonable" - for example, searches now routine at
airports and at entrances to courts and other official buildings. But where, as in this case, public
safety is not genuinely in jeopardy, the Fourth Amendment precludes the suspicionless search,
no matter how conveniently arranged.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
109 Id. at 324 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
11o Id. at 325 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
"I Id. at 325-26 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
112 Id. at 326-28 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (noting that "[n]othing in the Fourth Amend-
ment or in any other part of the Constitution prevents a State from enacting a statute whose
principal vice is that it may seem misguided or even silly to the Members of this Court"). Id.
at 328.
113 City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 34-36 (2000) (indicating that the City
operated these checkpoints during daylight hours, posting lighted signs that read
ANARCOTICS CHECKPOINT [number] MILE AHEAD, NARCOTICS K-9 IN USE, BE
PREPARED TO STOP").
114 Id. at 35-36.
15 Id. at 36 (The city policy as implemented was to ensure that most drivers would not be
detained beyond five minutes.).
116 Id. at 35.
117 Id. at 36 (The complainants were James Edmond and Joell Palmer, both of whom were
stopped by officers at a City checkpoint in September 1998.).
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the "special needs" drug testing line of cases: City of Indianapolis v.
Edmond.' 
18
The primary purpose of the suspicionless vehicle checkpoints in Indianap-
olis was to discover and interdict illegal drugs.' 1 9 The program was relatively
successful, as approximately nine percent of vehicles stopped resulted- in
arrests. ' 20 Similar warrantless checkpoints, all deemed to be searches pursuant
to the Fourth Amendment, had been upheld by the Supreme Court in the
past.' 2' Justice O'Connor, writing for the majority, distinguished these prior
cases by emphasizing that the primary purpose of the acceptable searches in
Sitz12 2 and Martinez-Fuerte 121 was something other than law enforcement, 1
4
whereas in Edmond, the point of the vehicle checkpoints was to intercept ille-
gal drugs that might otherwise enter the city. 125 Such broad-based law enforce-
ment techniques were held not to fall within the narrow category of searches
upheld by the Court under the "special needs" doctrine.'
2 6
Justice O'Connor was quick to proclaim that "the gravity of the threat
alone cannot be dispositive of questions concerning what means law enforce-
ment officers may employ to pursue a given purpose. "127 Rather, the defining
feature of the "special needs" test is precisely that the need being asserted is
something outside the realm of traditional law enforcement. 128 Without dis-
turbing prior precedent, Justice O'Connor assured that:
there are circumstances that may justify a law enforcement checkpoint where the
primary purpose would otherwise, but for some emergency, relate to ordinary crime
control. For example, as the Court of Appeals noted, the Fourth Amendment would
almost certainly permit an appropriately tailored roadblock set up to thwart an immi-
nent terrorist attack or to catch a dangerous criminal who is likely to flee by way of a
particular route. The exigencies created by these scenarios are far removed from the
circumstances under which authorities might simply stop cars as a matter of course to
see if there just happens to be a felon leaving the jurisdiction. While we do not limit
the purposes that may justify a checkpoint program to any rigid set of categories, we
decline to approve a program whose primary purpose is ultimately indistinguishable
from the general interest in crime control. 1
29
Justice Rehnquist wrote a dissenting opinion in which Justices Thomas
and Scalia joined.1 3 ° The dissenters focused on the seemingly natural evolu-
118 531 U.S. 32.
119 Id. at 34.
120 Id. at 34-35 (noting that, of the 104 arrests, 55 were for drug-related crimes).
121 Id. at 34 (citing Mich. Dept. of State Police v. Stiz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990) and United
States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976)).
122 496 U.S. 444 (1990) (involving Michigan highway sobriety checkpoints whose primary
purpose was to ensure driver safety by removing impaired drivers from the road).
123 428 U.S. 543 (1976) (upholding fixed border vehicle checkpoints due to the difficulty of
stopping illegal entrance by immigrants into the United States from Mexico).
124 City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 40 (2000) ("what principally distinguishes
these checkpoints from those we have previously approved is their primary purpose").
125 Id. at 41.
126 Id.
127 Id. at 42.
128 See supra notes 62-63 and accompanying text.
129 Id. at 44 (internal citations omitted).
130 Id. at 48 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
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tion of vehicle roadblock cases from Martinez-Fuerte13 ' to Sitz 13 2 to
Edmond.133 In fact, one of the purposes of the City of Indianapolis checkpoints
was assuredly to detect and disable impaired drivers from posing a threat on
Indianapolis roadways.1 34  Accordingly, the Chief Justice concluded that
"[b]ecause of the valid reasons for conducting these roadblock seizures, it is
constitutionally irrelevant that petitioners also hoped to interdict drugs."' 3 5
Justice Rehnquist was clear to distinguish the "special needs" cases, which he
suggested applied only to searches of homes and businesses, from the unique
area of roadblock seizures.' 3 6 In doing so, the Chief Justice failed to cite the
Court's Vernonia decision which broadened the category of "special needs"
cases to include suspicionless drug testing of students. The following term, the
issue of suspicionless drug testing would again face the Court in Ferguson v.
City of Charleston.'3 7
For the past two decades, the issue of drug use by expectant mothers has
become an increasing national concern.138 To address this dilemma, and to
combat the increased drug use by expectant mothers in the Charleston area, the
Medical University of South Carolina began implementing drug screens on
maternity patients that the hospital had reason to suspect might be using illegal
drugs, particularly cocaine. 1 39 Women testing positive were referred by the
hospital to drug counseling and treatment."4 This program failed to diminish
the drug problem among expectant mothers and prompted the state hospital to
implement more stringent testing.' 4 1  The modified testing procedures14 2
included potential legal sanctions for women who tested positive. 14 3
131 428 U.S. 543 (1976).
132 496 U.S. 444 (1990).
133 531 U.S. 32 (2000). See also Del. v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979) (recognizing the use
of vehicular checkpoints to check for driver's licenses and registrations).
134 531 U.S. at 51 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
131 Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (citing Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996)).
The Chief Justice later remarks that "[o]nce the constitutional requirements for a particular
seizure are satisfied, the subjective expectations of those responsible for it, be it police
officers or members of a city council, are irrelevant."
136 Id. at 53 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) ("[W]hatever sense a non-law-enforcement pri-
mary purpose test may make in the search setting, it is ill suited to brief roadblock seizures,
where we have consistently looked at 'the scope of the stop' in assessing a program's
constitutionality.").
137 532 U.S. 67 (2001).
138 Id. at 70 n.1 (observing that several witnesses testified at trial that "the problem of
'crack babies' was widely perceived in the late 1980s as a national epidemic, prompting
considerable concern both in the medical community and among the general populace").
139 Id. at 70.
140 Id.
141 Id. at 70-71.
142 Id. at 72 n.4 (describing the nine criteria for discerning which maternity patients should
be tested. The categories included those (1) with no prenatal care; (2) late prenatal care after
twenty-four weeks gestation; (3) incomplete prenatal care; (4) abruptio placenta; (5)
intrauterine fetal death; (6) preterm labor of "no obvious cause"; (7) intrauterine growth
retardation of "no obvious cause"; (8) previously known drug or alcohol abuse; and, (9)
unexplained congenital anomalies).
143 Id. at 72-73. The process, in detail, was as follows:
The threat of law enforcement involvement was set forth in two protocols, the first dealing with
the identification of drug use during pregnancy, and the second with identification of drug use
[Vol. 3:411
Winter 2002/2003] STUDENTS' PRIVACY RIGHTS AFTER EARLS 429
Ten women, arrested under the policy after testing positive, initiated suit
challenging the unlawfulness of the search." Ferguson ultimately made its
way to the Supreme Court to clarify whether the "special needs" doctrine
should apply to warrantless, suspicionless drug testing that contained both a
medical and law enforcement purpose.145 The Court, with Justice Stevens writ-
ing for the majority, promptly distinguished this case from the Court's previous
drug testing cases where the results were not turned over to any third party.146
In particular, the Court's previous drug testing cases permitted suspicionless
searches where the results of the test were not turned over to law enforcement
and criminal sanction was not a possible consequence of testing positive.147
In describing application of the "special needs" test, Justice Stevens pro-
claimed that the Court employs "a balancing test that weigh[s] the intrusion on
the individual's interest in privacy against the 'special needs' that support[ ] the
program." '14 8 In harmonizing the Court's holding in Ferguson with the holding
in Edmond, the majority emphasized that:
The critical difference between those four drug-testing cases [where the Court upheld
the suspicionless search] and this one, however, lies in the nature of the "special
need" asserted as justification for the warrantless searches. In each of those earlier
cases, the "special need" that was advanced as a justification for the absence of a
warrant or individualized suspicion was one divorced from the State's general inter-
est in law enforcement. This point was emphasized both in the majority opinions
sustaining the programs in the first three cases, as well as in the dissent in the Chan-
dler case. In this case, however, the central and indispensable feature of the policy
after labor. Under the latter protocol, the police were to be notified without delay and the patient
promptly arrested. Under the former, after the initial positive drug test, the police were to be
notified (and the patient arrested) only if the patient tested positive for cocaine a second time or
if she missed an appointment with a substance abuse counselor. In 1990, however, the policy
was modified at the behest of the solicitor's office to give the patient who tested positive during
labor, like the patient who tested positive during a prenatal care visit, an opportunity to avoid
arrest by consenting to substance abuse treatment.
The last six pages of the policy contained forms for the patients to sign, as well as proce-
dures for the police to follow when a patient was arrested. The policy also prescribed in detail
the precise offenses with which a woman could be charged, depending on the stage of her preg-
nancy. If the pregnancy was 27 weeks or less, the patient was to be charged with simple posses-
sion. If it was 28 weeks or more, she was to be charged with possession and distribution to a
person under the age of 18 - in this case, the fetus, If she delivered "while testing positive for
illegal drugs," she was also to be charged with unlawful neglect of a child. Under the policy, the
police were instructed to interrogate the arrestee in order "to ascertain the identity of the subject
who provided illegal drugs to the suspect." Other than the provisions describing the substance
abuse treatment to be offered to women who tested positive, the policy made no mention of any
change in the prenatal care of such patients, nor did it prescribe any special treatment for the
newborns.
Id.
144 Id. at 73.
145 Id. at 77.
146 Id. (citing Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305 (1997); Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives'
Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989); Treasury Employees v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989); and
Vernonia School Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995)).
147 See generally Skinner, 489 U.S. 602; supra notes 76-88 and accompanying text; Von
Raab, 489 U.S. 646; supra notes 93-98 and accompanying text; Acton, 515 U.S. 646; infra
notes 182-84 and accompanying text.
148 Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 78 (2001).
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Respondents argue in essence that their ultimate purpose - namely, protecting the
health of both mother and child - is a beneficent one. In Chandler, however, we did
not simply accept the State's invocation of a "special need." Instead, we carried out
a "close review" of the scheme at issue before concluding that the need in question
was not "special" as that term has been defined in our cases .... In looking to the
programmatic purpose, we consider all the available evidence in order to determine
the relevant primary purpose .... While the ultimate goal of the program may well
have been to get the women in question into substance abuse treatment and off drugs,
the immediate objective of the searches was to generate evidence for law enforce-
ment purposes in order to reach that goal.
150
Although the Court has permitted, in the past, resort to the "special needs"
doctrine to circumvent the traditional and literal requirements of the Fourth
Amendment, such elastic application is not permitted when the ultimate goal of
the search is to further law enforcement or criminal investigations."'5 Rather, it
is precisely when evidence is being gathered for utilization in criminal proceed-
ings that the pure strictures of the Fourth Amendment must be adhered to. 15 2
Thus, in relying on the distinction first set forth in Edmond, a majority of
the Court was unwilling to rely on the "special needs" doctrine to exempt state
hospital drug searches of expectant women when the results of the tests were
ultimately turned over to the police.15 3
Justice Kennedy wrote separately to concur in the judgment.' 54 His prin-
ciple disagreement with the majority was that a policy should be evaluated by
its ultimate goal (i.e., preserving the health of newborn infants) rather than its
proximate purpose.'5 5 This approach acknowledges one of the natural conse-
quences of any search is the collection of some form of evidence. 156 In fact,
the first "special needs" case, T.L.O. v. New Jersey,157 permitted dual use of the
evidence obtained through the search - for both school discipline and criminal
adjudication.' 5 8 The use of evidence in both the school and prosecutorial con-
text did not otherwise delegitimize the search.
In addition, Justice Kennedy found that there was an element of voluntari-
ness to the "special needs" cases. 159 His statements regarding voluntariness
149 Id. at 79-80.
"o Id. at 81-84 (emphasis in original).
151 Id. at 84-85.
152 Id.
153 Id.
154 Id. at 86 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
15 Id. at 87-88 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
156 Id. See also T.L.O. v. N.J., 469 U.S. 325 (1985) (wherein the evidence obtained by the
Vice Principal served as the basis for adjudicating T.L.O. a delinquent. The primary purpose
of that search was to maintain order and discipline in the classroom.).
157 T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325.
158 Id.
159 Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 90-91 (2001) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
For example, in Vernonia, students had the option of either participating or abstaining from
participation in school-sponsored athletic competitions. See Vernonia School Dist. 47J v.
Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995); infra notes 169-72 and accompanying text.
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and consent serve as an ominous foreshadowing of what would ultimately
become fundamental to the Court's holding in the Earls case.' 6 ° As will be
discussed later in this article, Justice Kennedy authored the majority opinion in
Von Raab and much of his reasoning, first set forth in his concurrence in Fer-
guson, would be adopted by five members of the Court.
Justice Scalia, writing for the dissent, was joined by Justices Rehnquist
and Thomas.' 6 1 Justice Scalia did not see any need for the Court to resort to
the "special needs" doctrine as he found that the women in Ferguson had all
consented to the urine tests they challenged.' 62 Justice Scalia further distin-
guished the search involved in the act of collecting urine from the (non-search)
act, the testing of the urine itself. 163 Focusing on the medical benefits to drug
testing expectant mothers, Justice Scalia found the program - which he
believed was not initiated at police suggestion nor tainted with police involve-
ment - acceptable."64 It would ultimately be the voices of Justices Kennedy,
Rehnquist and Scalia who would broaden the "special needs" doctrine in the
context of suspicionless drug testing in Vernonia and Earls.
C. The School Cases: Vernonia and Earls
"Our government is the potent, the omnipresent teacher. For good or ill, it teaches
the whole people by its example."
16 5
1. Vernonia - the Stepping Stone
"[C]hildren at school do not enjoy two of the Fourth Amendment's traditional cate-
gorical protections against unreasonable searches and seizures: the warrant require-
ment and the probable cause requirement. . . . The instant case, however, asks
whether the Fourth Amendment is even more lenient than that, i.e., whether it is so
lenient that students may be deprived of the Fourth Amendment's only remaining,
and most basic, categorical protection: its strong preference for an individualized
suspicion requirement, with its accompanying antipathy toward personally intrusive,
blanket searches of mostly innocent people."
' 16 6
160 Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 90-91 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Kennedy foreshadows
the reasoning that would soon become law in a brief concurring opinion:
An essential, distinguishing feature of the special needs cases is that the person searched has
consented, though the usual voluntariness analysis is altered because adverse consequences (e.g.,
dismissal from employment or disqualification from playing on a high school sports team) will
follow from refusal. The person searched has given consent, as defined to take into account that
the consent was not voluntary in the full sense of the word. The consent, and the circumstances
in which it was given, bear upon the reasonableness of the whole special needs program.
Id. at 91-92 (internal citations omitted).
161 Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 91 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
162 Id. at 98 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (explaining that "[t]he special needs doctrine is thus
quite irrelevant, since it operates only to validate searches and seizures that are otherwise
unlawful").
163 Id. at 92-93 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
'64 Id. at 99-100 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
165 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
166 Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 681 (1995) (O'Connor, J., dissenting)
(emphasis in original).
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In 1991, a seventh grade boy, James Acton, wanted to play football at his
elementary school in Oregon. 167 Prior to taking the field and suiting up, how-
ever, James was required by the Student Athlete Drug Policy ("the Policy") to
submit to a warrantless, suspicionless drug test to ensure that he, and all others
participating in extracurricular athletics, were drug free. 168 In addition, as a
condition for participating in athletics, the school district required James and
the other Vernonia students in grades seven through twelve to agree to submit
to random, suspicionless drug testing during each season. 169 James and his
parents refused to sign the requisite consent forms for the drug testing. 170 As a
result, James was prohibited from playing football at school.
17 1
James and his parents filed suit in federal district court challenging the
policy under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment. 1 72 After a full trial on the
merits, the district court sustained the policy against constitutional challenge,
finding that there was ample evidence of drug use among student athletes in
Vemonia. 1 73 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the
district court, finding that the policy violated both the United States Constitu-
tion and the Oregon state constitution. 174 The United States Supreme Court
granted certiorari in the case to determine whether the policy violated students'
rights to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures pursuant to the Fourth
Amendment. 1
75
Writing for the majority, 176 Justice Scalia found no constitutional defi-
ciency in the Vernonia drug testing policy. Following its consistent pattern, the
Court held that the collection and testing of students' urine pursuant to the
school's policy constituted a search under the Fourth Amendment.' 77 As an
initial matter, Justice Scalia emphasized the pervasive and alarming drug use
167 Id. at 651.
168 Id. at 648-52 (explaining the drug testing policy adopted in Vernonia, a small Oregon
town).
169 Id. at 650 (explaining the Policy as follows: "The Policy applies to all students partici-
pating in interscholastic athletics. Students wishing to play sports must sign a form con-
senting to the testing and must obtain the written consent of their parents. Athletes are tested
at the beginning of the season for their sport. In addition, once each week of the season the
names of the athletes are placed in a 'pool' from which a student, with the supervision of two
adults, blindly draws the names of 10% of the athletes for random testing. Those selected
are notified and tested that same day, if possible.").
170 Id. at 651.
171 Id.
172 Id. at 651-52. In addition, the Actons challenged the Policy under Article I, § 9 of the
Oregon Constitution. In their suit, the Actons sought both declaratory and injunctive relief.
173 Id. at 652 (indicating that the parties submitted to a bench, rather than jury, trial). The
district court's opinion may be found at 796 F. Supp. 1354 (Or. 1992).
174 Id. The original decision of the Ninth Circuit may be found at 23 F.3d 1514 (9th Cir.
1994).
175 The decision granting certiorari may be found at 513 U.S. 1013 (1994).
176 Justice Scalia, Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices Kennedy, Thomas, Ginsburg, and
Breyer formed a 6-3 majority. In addition, Justice Ginsburg wrote a separate, one-paragraph
concurring opinion to express her understanding that the opinion in Vernonia did not make
any comment on the possible constitutionality of a more broad drug testing program - partic-
ularly one that might attempt to test all students. See id. at 666 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
177 Id. at 652.
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among student athletes in Vernonia.' 78 The evidence at trial suggested a strong
link between increased discipline incidents and student drug use. 179 In addi-
tion, the Court emphasized the safety concerns noted below in the district court
that use of illicit drugs by student athletes increases risk of injury by interrupt-
ing the natural reactions and judgments of an athlete. 80
The expressed purpose of the policy was "to prevent student athletes from
using drugs, to protect their health and safety, and to provide drug users with
assistance programs." '18 1 Thus, the urine collected from each student-athlete
and the accompanying test results were not shared with police nor were they
utilized for criminal enforcement of the state's drug laws.18 This limited use
of data, where the primary purpose of testing is not for law enforcement, is the
hallmark of "special needs" searches that have survived constitutional attack.
In fact, Justice Blackmun's initial explanation of the court-created doctrine
explicitly states that "only in those exceptional circumstances in which special
needs beyond the normal need for law enforcement" are present will the dis-
pensation of a warrant and probable cause be sustainable against a Fourth
Amendment challenge.
183
A troubling portion of the Vernonia decision is that the majority found, for
the first time, that "special needs" exist generally within the public school con-
text. 1 84 Rather than retain the narrow limitation of T.L.O. 's focus on the need
for swift and informal discipline in a school setting, the majority simply
extended T.L.O.'s meaning to encompass the school environment, in its
entirety, based on the resurrected concept of in loco parentis.1 8 5 Even the
renewal of the in loco parentis doctrine seems uncomfortably stretched to fit
the needs of state-compelled drug testing. And, under this interpretation of in
loco parentis, the rights of parents to raise their children and direct their educa-
tion run subordinate to the schools' custodial and tutelary burden. 186 The fact
that parents may want to deter drug use among their children in a manner that is
not involuntary and devoid of suspicion becomes irrelevant. To participate in
178 Id. at 648-49, 662-64. Not only was drug use exacerbated among the student athlete
population at Vernonia, there was evidence that the athletes were "the leaders of the drug
culture." Id. at 649.
179 Id. at 648-49 (observing that disciplinary referrals had doubled and that student behavior
was disrupting the educational experience in the classroom).
180 Id. at 649. In particular, Justice Scalia noted that "[t]he high school football and wres-
tling coach witnessed a severe sternum injury suffered by a wrestler, and various omissions
of safety procedures and misexecutions by football players, all attributable in his belief to the
effects of drug use." Id.
181 Id. at 650.
182 Id. at 651 (indicating that "[o]nly the superintendent, principals, vice-principals, and
athletic directors have access to test results, and the results are not kept for more than one
year").
183 See generally T.L.O. v. N.J., 469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985) (Blackmun, J., concurring)
(emphasis added).
184 Vemonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 653 (1995). No citations were provided
by the Court, however, to affirm this very broad, general and, I would argue, transmogrified
extension of the holding in T.L.O.
185 Id. at 654-55.
186 See id. at 656 ("Fourth Amendment rights, no less than First and Fourteenth Amend-
ment rights, are different in public schools than elsewhere; the 'reasonableness' inquiry can-
not disregard the schools' custodial and tutelary responsibility for children.").
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student athletics in Vernonia, the desire of the actual parent to protect his/her
child from warrantless, suspicionless drug testing by the state was deemed sec-
ondary to the school's desire to deal with a drug epidemic.
In sustaining the Student Athlete Drug Policy against the Actons' chal-
lenge, the Court took into account the following three factors: (1) the students'
legitimate expectations of privacy; (2) the character of the intrusion; and (3) the
nature and immediacy of the governmental concerns and the efficacy of the
means for meeting those concerns. 187 The Court did not appear to hold any one
of the three components above any other, nor did it appear that a policy omit-
ting any of three requirements would be tolerated. The opinion suggests, albeit
erroneously we subsequently learn in Earls,188 that two of the more important
justifications for upholding the Vernonia policy were found in the latter ele-
ments - the nature and immediacy of the governmental concerns and the effi-
cacy of meeting those concerns via suspicionless search.
The majority easily dispensed with the first element: the students' legiti-
mate expectations of privacy. Justice Scalia clearly noted that students as a
whole have more limited expectations of privacy due to their involuntary status
as schoolchildren. In addition, the Court spent several paragraphs explaining
that athletes, by the very nature of communal undress and their voluntary sub-
jugation to added rules and regulations for participation, have a lessened expec-
tation of privacy in comparison with the student population at large.189 For
these reasons, the Court abruptly found that student athletes have a lowered
expectation of privacy.
The second issue, the character of the search or intrusion, was equally
minimized. Although past decisions had noted the intimate nature of urinating
in public and the traditional protection of bodily fluids, the Court found requir-
ing children to pee in a cup in the sight or sound of their coach or teacher was
"negligible."' 90 Justice Scalia wrote that the conditions of testing are no more
187 Id. at 664-65 ("Taking into account all the factors we have considered above - the
decreased expectation of privacy, the relative unobtrusiveness of the search, and the severity
of the need met by the search - we conclude Vernonia's Policy is reasonable and hence
constitutional.") (emphasis added).
188 See infra notes 224-30 and accompanying text.
189 Justice Scalia remarks that:
Legitimate privacy expectations are even less with regard to student athletes. School sports are
not for the bashful. They require "suiting up" before each practice or event, and showering and
changing afterwards. Public school locker rooms, the usual sites for these activities, are not
notable for the privacy they afford .... There is an additional respect in which school athletes
have a reduced expectation of privacy. By choosing to "go out for the team," they voluntarily
subject themselves to a degree of regulation even higher than that imposed on students generally.
Id. (emphasis added). Justice Scalia also emphasizes that students choosing to participate in
athletics will be required to undergo physical examination and that students, in general, are
subject to state-compelled inoculations to protect against the spread of disease. Justice
O'Connor both notes and distinguishes this argument in her dissent by writing:
It might also be noted that physical exams (and of course vaccinations) are not searches for
conditions that reflect wrongdoing on the part of the student, and so are wholly nonaccusatory
and have no consequences that can be regarded as punitive. These facts may explain the absence
of Fourth Amendment challenge to such searches.
Vemonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 683 (1995) (O'Connor, J., dissenting)
(emphasis in original).
190 Id. at 658.
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onerous than those "typically encountered in public restrooms" which all citi-
zens use daily.' 9'
The unfortunate consequence of this finding is that it completely mini-
mizes the horrors of adolescence - the time when male junior high students
begin growing pubic hair and become self-conscious of their genitalia and the
new and, often, uncomfortable bodily responses that accompany puberty. Like-
wise, junior high is often the time when female students begin menstruating.
Imagine the humiliation and embarrassment of a menstruating junior high stu-
dent required to provide school officials with a urine sample that will possibly
reveal that she is taking birth control pills, is HIV positive, is on medication for
depression, or perhaps suffers from a sexually transmitted disease. To assert
that providing a urine sample during these formative and agonizing years
presents only a "negligible" privacy violation denies a very real fact of adoles-
cence - every little act or action is generally amplified and overwhelming. It is
disingenuous to suggest that taking a state-compelled urine sample from an
adolescent does not invoke the most intimate of privacy interests.
192
Furthermore, the Court was able to dismiss the nature of the invasion of
privacy by focusing merely on the aspect of collecting the urine sample from
the student. The Court ignored the ultimate intrusion of the actual testing pro-
cess and what it can reveal about a person. The Court's minimization of the
privacy interests at stake is the failure to continue recognizing that our urine
may provide evidence of latent medical conditions as well as any substances
ingested. In fact, a search of one's urine becomes more intrusive than allowing
the government into one's home to rifle through the medicine cabinets. And
there are intimate privacy interests that attach to the medical conditions one has
in our society. We should be reluctant to permit the state to search our chil-
dren's urine for evidence of any condition without suspicion.' 93 If we are to
tolerate drug testing to ensure the safety of athletes due to the rigors of compe-
tition, why not pregnancy or AIDS testing? What is to prevent further exten-
191 Id.
192 See Amicus Brief, Earls, submitted by the American Academy of Pediatrics, et al.,
available at 2002 WL 206367. The American Academy of Pediatrics brief reminds that "this
Court has recognized [that] the act of urination is one that society treats as quintessentially
private: urination in public is the subject of almost universal social disapproval and legal
prohibition; urine is treated as waste, to be promptly disposed of; and even among mature
adults, the subject is referred to, euphemistically, if at all." Id. at 15 (citation omitted).
'1 Amicus Brief, Earls, submitted by Jean Burkett, et al., available at 2002 WL 206374.
Ms. Burkett explains on behalf of herself and others that:
Amici oppose the Policy because it takes parenting away from the parents; it unfairly targets
children who are unlikely to use drugs; it stamps a badge of shame onto children whose parents
might wish to approach the issue of drug use without imposing mandatory urinalysis on their
children; it unnecessarily forces parents to choose between two parenting strategies they deem
essential - encouraging participation in extra-curricular activities and maintaining a parent-child
relationship based on trust and respect; it creates an atmosphere of distrust and disrespect at
school, and potentially at home; and it usurps parents' authority to make decisions about how
their children are raised. These parents disagree with the proposition that the school district is
entitled to assault the integrity of the parent-child relationship.
Id. at 6.
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sion of the special needs doctrine in relation to our children? 194 Perhaps the
state, via the school, will entertain the idea of keeping those whose medical
conditions make them more susceptible to injury or exacerbation of a health
condition from participating in athletics. 195 Certainly contact sports, such as
soccer and basketball, are more dangerous for mother and fetus in the third
trimester than, perhaps, in the first. If we are willing to dilute students' rights
based simply on their lack of privacy as set forth in Vernonia, then the slippery
slope argument that a parade of horribles will follow may not be completely
unfounded.
The third major factor considered by the Court - the immediacy of the
governmental interest and the efficacy of the search in meeting the concerns -
is perhaps the least offensive, at least in the manner applied in Vernonia. The
Court painstakingly reiterated that there was evidence at the district court level
of a drug epidemic among student athletes. Further, the presence of drugs on
campus was causing disruption at school. This is the very notion - securing
order and discipline in the educational setting - that underlies the need to dis-
pose of a warrant requirement in T.L.O. Thus, the majority correctly extended
the T.L.O. "special needs" doctrine to this narrow category where drug use
combines with disciplinary problems to disrupt the learning environment.
The prevalence of drugs and, more particularly in Vernonia, the specific
evidence of disorder in the classroom were appropriately deemed by the Court
to constitute a compelling governmental interest. 1 96 Few would challenge that
drug use among our children is of vital concern and importance to all of soci-
ety. And, it should be axiomatic at this point that safety, order, and discipline
are prerequisites to learning. The importance of applying a balancing test to
address this "special needs" scenario - balancing the privacy interests of the
students against the strength of the government's concern and the efficacy in a
search addressing this concern - is somewhat analogous to the testing of equal
protection claims under either the rational basis, mid-tier or strict scrutiny tests.
The "balancing test" language is something the Court is very familiar with and
usually astute in applying. Thus, it is difficult at this stage of constitutional
development to criticize the extension of T.L.O. to the facts of Vernonia.
194 The broad language of the Court in both Vernonia and Earls causes great discomfort to
this author. For example, Justice Scalia, writing for the majority in Vernonia contends that
"[d]eterring drug use by our Nation's schoolchildren is at least as important" as the interests
protected in both Skinner and Von Raab. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646,
661 (1995). But, were adolescent pregnancy or AIDS to become a national crisis, this
approach and reasoning would likewise support the testing of individuals to "deter" sexual
promiscuity among teens. Current approaches to teach either abstinence or to educate stu-
dents on the potential perils of sexual conduct, much like the efforts that failed in both
Vernonia and Earls, have not successfully overcome these continuing dangers of young
adulthood.
195 Acton, 515 U.S. at 662 (wherein the Court notes that "it must not be lost sight of that this
program is directed more narrowly to drug use by school athletes, where the risk of immedi-
ate physical harm to the drug user or those with whom he is playing his sport is particularly
high. Apart from psychological effects, which include impairment of judgment, slow reac-
tion time, and a lessening of the perception of pain, the particular drugs screened by the
District's Policy have been demonstrated to pose substantial physical risks to athletes.").
196 Id. at 661.
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Justice Scalia convincingly explained the efficacy of the drug testing in
Vernonia by observing that it seems "self-evident that a drug problem largely
fueled by the 'role model' effect of athletes' drug use, and of particular danger
to athletes, is effectively addressed by making sure that athletes do not use
drugs."'19 7 Although the Actons argued for a least-intrusive search requirement
under the "special needs" doctrine, the Court found that searches under the
Fourth Amendment need only be "reasonable."'' There is no corresponding
need that a search under the Fourth Amendment be the least intrusive possi-
ble.199 Accordingly, schools looking to the Court for guidance regarding the
implementation of drug testing policies, following Vernonia, would consider
the combined application of the three elements noted above.20 ° Generally,
schools would have been lulled into believing that, provided they could demon-
strate that a severe enough drug problem existed and that the test for collecting
specimens was relatively unobtrusive, the test would pass Constitutional mus-
ter.2°' Seven years later, this notion would be dramatically altered.
2. Earls - Redefining "Special Needs" in the Public Schools
"There is no drug exception to the Constitution, any more than there is a communism
exception or an exception for other real or imagined sources of domestic unrest."
2 0 2
The first two sentences of Board of Education of Independent School Dis-
trict No. 92 of Pottawatomie County v. Earls ("Earls"), omit any language of
197 Id. at 663.
198 Id. at 663-64.
199 In this manner, the Court clearly conveys the dissimilarity to Fourth Amendment search
cases from the Equal Protection line of decisions that, on occasion, employs strict scrutiny
review. See generally Loving v. Virginia, 381 U.S. 1, 11 (1967) (noting that "[a]t the very
least, the Equal Protection Clause demands that racial classifications, especially suspect in
criminal statutes, be subjected to the 'most rigid scrutiny,' " Korematsu v. United States, 323
U.S. 214, 216 (1944)). Race discrimination cases initiated under the Fourteenth Amendment
Equal Protection Clause have routinely been subjected to strict scrutiny review. See gener-
ally also Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). Thus,
although the Court utilizes the term "compelling" state interest to describe the importance of
deterring drug use among schoolchildren, there is no concomitant need of the Court to then
apply a "least restrictive" analysis that is routinely applied in strict scrutiny review.
200 The "least intrusive" search issue was one of the areas where Justice O'Connor parted
ways with the majority. Her concern was that regardless of whether the Court should apply
a least-intrusive analysis, the mandates of the Fourth Amendment clearly call for this very
assessment.
In any event, whether the Court is right that the District reasonably weighed the lesser intrusion
of a suspicion-based scheme against its policy concerns [militating in favor of suspicionless
testing] is beside the point. As stated, a suspicion-based search regime is not just any less intru-
sive alternative; the individualized suspicion requirement has a legal pedigree as old as the
Fourth Amendment itself, and it may not be easily cast aside in the name of policy concerns. It
may only be forsaken, our cases in the personal search context have established, if a suspicion-
based regime would likely be ineffectual.
Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 678 (1995) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
201 Id. at 646. ("Taking into account all the factors we have considered above - the
decreased expectation of privacy, the relative unobtrusiveness of the search, and the severity
of the need met by the search - we conclude the Vernonia Policy is reasonable and hence
constitutional.").
202 Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 641 (1989) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
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balancing tests, Fourth Amendment searches, and any language regarding "spe-
cial needs. 2 °3 Nonetheless, in these two sentences Justice Thomas gives
license to schools to test not only students participating in extracurricular activ-
ities but, potentially, any student that "reasonably serves the School District's
important interest in detecting and preventing drug use among students. ' '2° 4
Justice Thomas was equally curt in explaining that the Supreme Court
"has previously held that 'special needs' inhere in the public school con-
text."' 20 5 Conspicuously missing in this statement is an explanation of how or
why "special needs" are applicable generally in the school setting. This state-
ment, like much of the Earls opinion, is disconcertingly broad in its potential
for future application. The fact that the "special needs" doctrine first emanated
from T.L.O., in a concurring opinion nonetheless, does not suffice to hold that
"special needs" applies in every school case. °6 Rather, the Court disappoints
proponents of stare decisis in not limiting its findings more narrowly to the
specific facts and settings of the cases cited for authority. For example, the
"special needs" doctrine was born in T.L.O. out of a need to provide school
officials with a rapid response to safety, order, and discipline situations in pub-
lic schools.20 7 There is nothing in the T.L.O. opinion that mandates a similar
finding in suspicionless drug testing cases.20 8
Likewise, the case of Vernonia is cited for the principle that "a finding of
individualized suspicion may not be necessary when a school conducts drug
testing. ' '  While this statement is factually true, its presentation in Earls is
misleadingly simple. In fact, much of the majority's opinion seems to rely on
these two statements - that "special needs" applies to school and that individu-
alized suspicion is not necessary for drug testing public school students - with-
out relying on the prior context and limited presentation of previous decisions.
Tecumseh, Oklahoma is a rural area located just outside Oklahoma City,
Oklahoma.2"0 In 1998, following Vernonia, the Tecumseh School District
adopted a suspicionless drug testing policy that included athletes and all stu-
203 122 S. Ct. 2559, 2562. Writing for the majority, Justice Thomas announces:
The Student Activities Drug Testing Policy implemented by the Board of Education of Indepen-
dent School District No. 92 of Pottawatomie County (School District) requires all students who
participate in competitive extracurricular activities to submit to drug testing. Because this Policy
reasonably serves the School District's important interest in detecting and preventing drug use
among its students, we hold that it is constitutional.
Id.
204 Id.
205 Id. at 2564.
206 But see Vemonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995).
207 T.L.O. v. N.J., 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
208 See supra notes 42-49 and accompanying text. T.L.O. emphasized that permitting
school officials to search students under a lower standard of suspicion (reasonable suspicion)
was due to the importance of school officials needing to provide swift discipline. The search
at issue in T.L.O. followed a violation of school rules. In contrast, the suspicionless regime
does not rely on any observed or imminent violation of school rules; rather, suspicionless
testing relies on nothing more than a mere hunch that something may be amiss in a very
broad, generalized manner.
209 Bd. of Educ. of I.S.D. No. 92 of Pottawatomie County, Okla. v. Earls, 122 S. Ct. 2559,
2565 (2002).
210 Id. at 2562.
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dents participating in extracurricular activities. 21' Lindsay Earls was a member
of the Academic Team, the band, and competitive choir while attending
Tecumseh High School, making her susceptible to the drug testing policy. She
and a fellow student2 1 2 initiated suit alleging that the drug testing policy vio-
lated their Fourth Amendment rights.21 3 In addition, the pair challenged the
policy for failing to address any "special need" in the school or school district
that might justify implementation of suspicionless testing.2 4  The District
Court resolved the suit on a Motion for Summary Judgment, finding in favor of
the School District.2 5 Earls appealed.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed the finding of
the District Court with only one judge dissenting.21 6 The Tenth Circuit major-
ity opinion deliberately set forth the summary judgment evidence regarding
drug use - or lack of drug use - in Tecumseh.21 7 Because the standard on
summary judgment is significantly distinct from the standard required to
uphold a decision following a full trial,21 8 the Court of Appeals was able to
211 Id. at 2563-64. Although the Student Activities Drug Testing Policy required all middle
and high school students to submit to suspicionless drug testing as a condition for participa-
tion in extracurricular activities, its application has been much more narrow. As the Court
noted, "[i]n practice, the Policy has been applied only to competitive extracurricular activi-
ties sanctioned by the Oklahoma Secondary Schools Activities Association, such as the Aca-
demic Team, Future Farmers of America, Future Homemakers of America, band, choir,
pom-pom, cheerleading, and athletics."
212 Id. at 2563 n.1. Daniel James, the other named plaintiff, most likely lost his standing to
challenge the Policy as his grades disqualified his participation in extracurricular activities.
Because the issue regarding standing was not dispositive to the merits of the suit, as Lindsay
Earls maintained standing, the District Court did not resolve the question of whether Daniel
James had standing. Similarly, finding that Earls had standing, the Supreme Court did not
address the standing issue as to James. Id.
213 Id. at 2563.
214 Id.
215 Id. For the full District Court opinion, see 115 F. Supp. 2d 1281 (W.D. Okla. 2000).
216 Id. at 2563-64. For the full Tenth Circuit opinion, see 242 F.3d 1264 (10th Cir. 2001).
Judge Ebel wrote a lengthy dissent at the circuit court level. His dissent begins at 242 F.3d
1279 (Ebel, J., dissenting).
217 242 F.3d at 1272-74 (cataloguing the testimony regarding drug use among students).
Unlike the picture painted by the U.S. Supreme Court in Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No.
92 of Pottawatomie County v. Earls, 122 S. Ct. 2559, 2568 (2002) (noting that "[t]he School
District has provided sufficient evidence to shore up the need for its drug testing program"),
the Tenth Circuit panel found:
In sum, while there was clearly some drug use at Tecumseh schools, such use among students
subject to the testing Policy was negligible. It was vastly different from the epidemic of drug use
and discipline problems among the very group subject to testing in Vernonia.
Id. In contrast, no footnote is provided in the Supreme Court's majority opinion with spe-
cific details or findings regarding the number of students accused of using drugs. The appel-
late decision, however, provides detailed data of the number of accusals, the number of
participants in extracurricular activities, and the number of students testing positive during
the Policy's lifespan. 242 F.3d at 1272-73.
218 Appellate decisions reviewing summary judgment utilize the de novo standard of review
to assess whether a genuine issue of material fact exists. The de novo standard of review
permits appellate courts to consider the evidence anew, as if the court were making the initial
decision. This standard of review is much more searching than the standard applied -
clearly erroneous - to full trials.
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substitute its opinion for that of the District Court in reversing and remanding
the case for further proceedings.2" 9
The shortcoming of the policy noted by the Tenth Circuit was the fit
between the nature and immediacy of the governmental concern - keeping stu-
dents free from drugs - and the efficacy of the proffered solution.22 ° In partic-
ular, the circuit court challenged the tightness of the fit between testing some
students due to their participation in extracurricular activities while not testing
other students, such as those participating in classes involving laboratories,
chemicals, or sharp instruments, where impaired judgment might pose a similar
threat to safety. 221 The essence of the court's complaint is that the Tecumseh
policy is at once both over and under-inclusive.2 2 2
In reversing the holding of the Tenth Circuit, the Supreme Court did not
adhere to the traditional formula for "special needs" cases. Prior to Earls, most
commentators would have advised that three components set forth in Vernonia
were the sin qua non of suspicionless drug testing of public school students.
First, per Vernonia, most observers believed that the nature of the privacy inter-
est involved should be evaluated. Rather than truly consider the privacy inter-
ests of students in extracurricular activities, the Earls majority found that
urinating before a teacher or coach involves only a slight intrusion into an ado-
lescent's privacy. Rather than assess the privacy interests of students partaking
of extracurricular opportunities, the Court made every effort to explain that this
issue (i.e., whether students are subjected to communal undress and shower,
etc.) did not really play a decisive factor in the Vernonia decision. The Court
labored to explain that although Justice Scalia invested two lengthy paragraphs
to distinguishing the conduct of student athletes from the general student popu-
lation, what he really had intended to say was that students who voluntarily
subject themselves to greater scrutiny (i.e., adherence to greater academic regu-
lations than others) waive the privacy protections that they might otherwise
have. This statement surely cannot be true, as it was Justice Scalia who
reminded us in Lee v. Weisman22 3 that certain events in high school, such as a
graduation ceremony, are too important to be sacrificed at the cost of losing
219 242 F.3d at 1278-79 (noting their decision deviated from two other Circuits).
220 Id. at 1276-78.
221 Id. at 1277.
222 Id. at 1276-77. Because the Policy only applies to students participating in extracurricu-
lar activities, where drug use in not suspected as very high, the test is over inclusive because
it tests too many students in an effort to find just a very few students who may be using
drugs. Likewise, the test is under inclusive because it does not test all students whose activi-
ties relating to a school may pose a risk of safety to self or others. For example, the Policy
does not test students enrolled in driver's education, shop, chemistry, or home economics.
Similarly, the Policy does not require testing of students prior to attending prom, graduation,
or as a prerequisite to obtaining a parking decal for school use. The Circuit Court summa-
rizes its findings most succinctly in a footnote:
To the extent one could argue that the safety issue here is the health care risk of addiction or
physical harm from the use of drugs, then the logical solution is to test all students. The fact that
the District only tests a select group of students - those participating in extracurricular activities
- indicates that its testing Policy is not motivated simply by health care concerns.
Id. at 1277 n.12.
223 505 U.S. 577 (1992) (noting the vital importance of attending one's high school gradua-
tion ceremony).
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constitutional protections.2 2 4 Of all the areas where this majority seemingly
shift gears, this one presents the most glaring deviation from previous prece-
dent. Realizing that the Supreme Court cannot issue advisory opinions and
generally tries to steer clear of excessive dicta, it seems anomalous that Justice
Scalia would have been so careless with his language in the Vernonia opinion.
Second, most observers were convinced that the court would consider the
character of the intrusion, recognizing that, to be valid, the search need not be
the least intrusive, but need only be reasonable. As the process of state-com-
pelled urination does not deviate significantly from that approved in Vernonia,
there is little reason to believe that this collection process would be deemed
invalid. But this author, and many others, continues to believe that the Court
fails to adequately grasp the significance for children of urinating in public
before a teacher or coach. Unlike the prior drug testing cases, Skinner and Von
Raab, where the process of urine collection occurred in a medical facility, the
tests conducted in the school setting require children to urinate in front of
teachers and school officials with whom they have a daily relationship. Thus,
the school tests are distinguishable from the medical tests or analogies drawn to
school physicals because there is an additional element of familiarity with the
testers that compounds the embarrassing nature of the test itself.
Finally, most commentators believed that a school district would have to
provide evidence of a drug problem at the school.2 25 This belief is consistent
with Justice Scalia's earlier approach in the case of Von Raab, where his vocif-
erous dissent chastised the majority for burdening a class of citizenry we had
no reason to suspect had engaged in wrongdoing.22 6 Further, proof of an
urgent need, beyond the need for normal law enforcement, has traditionally
been the hallmark of the "special needs" cases. 2 7 Thus, the third requirement
observers were lulled into believing was critical to defend suspicionless drug
testing was proof that the nature and immediacy of the governmental concern
224 See also, Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 of Pottawatomie County v. Earls, 122
S. Ct. 2559, 2573 (2002) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Justice Ginsburg makes reference to the
Weisman decision by emphasizing that:
Participation in [extracurricular activities] is a key component of school life, essential in reality
for students applying to college, and, for all participants, a significant contributor to the breadth
and quality of the educational experience .... Students "volunteer" for extracurricular pursuits
in the same way they might volunteer for honors classes: They subject themselves to additional
requirements, but they do so in order to take full advantage of the education offered them.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
"I This is particularly true in relation to the Tenth Circuit opinion wherein the majority
writes:
[G]iven the paucity of the evidence of an actual drug abuse problem among those subject to the
Policy, the immediacy of the District's concern is greatly diminished. And, without a demon-
strated drug abuse problem among the group being tested, the efficacy of the District's solution
to the perceived problem is similarly greatly diminished. While the Court in Vernonia had no
trouble identifying the efficacy of a drug testing policy for athletes when the athletes were at the
heart of the drug problem, we see little efficacy in a drug testing policy which tests students
among whom there is no measurable drug problem.
Earls v. Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 of Pottawatomie County, 242 F.3d 1264,
1277-78 (10th Cir. 2001).
226 See supra notes 98-99 and accompanying text.
227 See, e.g., supra note 50 and accompanying text.
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and the efficacy of the policy adopted to address this concern were greater than
the need to protect the individual's right to privacy.228 However, proof of an
existing or threatened drug problem was not required by the Court in Earls to
uphold the Tecumseh policy.
229
In the end, Justice Thomas discounted the importance of a tight "fit"
between drug use and the efficacy of a suspicionless regime to meet the pur-
ported use discussed in Vernonia in finding:
[T]hat testing students who participate in extracurricular activities is a reasonably
effective means of addressing the School District's legitimate concerns in preventing,
deterring, and detecting drug use. While in Vernonia there might have been a closer
fit between the testing of athletes and the trial court's finding that the drug problem
was "fueled by the 'role model' effect of athletes' drug use," such a finding was not
essential to the holding.
2 3 0
Yet, the fact that there was evidence of a drug problem in Vernonia pro-
vided precisely the "special need," under traditional "special needs" analysis,
228 Chandler, 520 U.S. at 318-19. The Court, in striking down random, suspicionless drug
testing on adult candidates for political office, explained:
Our precedents establish that the proffered special need for drug testing must be substantial -
important enough to override the individual's acknowledged privacy interest, sufficiently vital to
suppress the Fourth Amendment's normal requirement of individualized suspicion .... [The
state in Chandler] failed to show, in justification [for suspicionless drug testing,] a special need
of that kind .... Notably lacking in respondent's presentation is any indication of a concrete
danger demanding departure from the Fourth Amendment's main rule.
Id.
229 Earls, 122 S. Ct. at 2567-68 (indicating that, to succeed on the Motion for Summary
Judgment, "[t]he School District has provided sufficient evidence to shore up the need for its
drug testing program"). In steering clear of requiring any specific amount of evidence
regarding drug use or impending drug use, the Court stated:
As we cannot articulate a threshold level of drug use that would suffice to justify a drug testing
program for schoolchildren, we refuse to fashion what would in effect be a constitutional quan-
tum of drug use necessary to show a "drug problem."
Id. at 2568. This paragraph underscores two important distinctions between Chandler (the
case striking down suspicionless drug testing on adult political candidates) and Earls. The
main distinction is found in the first sentence, wherein the Court uses the specific term
"schoolchildren." Future cases involving drug testing of schoolchildren will not require evi-
dence of drug use, while cases involving adults will. The second distinction between Chan-
dler and Earls is that the Court did not apply the traditional "special needs" test in reaching
its decision in Earls. The requirement, under the special needs balancing test, that evaluates
the privacy interests at stake against the efficacy of the government's selected testing regime
was not utilized in Earls. All that was necessary to uphold the District Court's grant of
summary judgment in Earls was evidence of potential drug use among children. This evi-
dence provided sufficient impetus to dispose of the literal Fourth Amendment requirements
for public school children.
230 Id. at 2569 (internal citation omitted). It is difficult to read Vernonia or any of the
"special needs" cases and anticipate that a complete lack of proof regarding the efficacy of
the program that devalues an individual's Fourth Amendment rights would ever be upheld.
This is especially true in the Earls case, where there was a scintilla of evidence regarding
any present or past drug use. Much of the evidence proffered, in fact, was speculative and,
at most, created a genuine issue of material of fact that should have been resolved at trial.
Or, if the proper summary judgment evidence standard had been applied - that all reasonable
inferences be drawn in favor of the party opposing the motion (in this case, Earls) - then
there would be only one or two known instances of drug use at Tecumseh. Such lack of
evidence historically prevented the application of "special needs" doctrine. See supra note
81 and accompanying text.
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that shifted the balance in favor of omitting the warrant requirement to test all
potential violators t.2 3  No such situation was present in Earls.232 Only Justices
Ginsburg, Stevens, O'Connor, and Souter seemed troubled by this point. 233 A
further, and important, deviation from the Vernonia decision is that there is no
explanation of hov such random, suspicionless testing furthers the safety inter-
ests of the school.234 Drug use may just as easily occur off campus as well as
231 See Treasury Employees v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting);
Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 321-22 (1997). The distinction between cases where a
"special need" has been demonstrated to permit random, suspicionless drug testing, such as
Skinner and Von Raab, and the cases where such a "special need" is not evidenced is clearly
drawn by the Chandler majority in the following manner:
What is left, after close review of Georgia's (random drug testing) scheme, is the image the State
seeks to project. By requiring candidates for public office to submit to drug testing, Georgia
displays its commitment to the struggle against drug abuse. The suspicionless tests, according to
respondents, signify that candidates, if elected, will be fit to serve their constituents free from the
influence of illegal drugs. But Georgia asserts no evidence of a drug problem among the State's
elected officials, those officials typically do not perform high-risk, safety-sensitive tasks, and the
required certification immediately aids no interdiction effort. The need revealed, in short, is
symbolic, not "special," as that term draws meaning from our case law.
Chandler, 520 U.S. at 321-22.
232 To gain a true appreciation for the paucity of evidence regarding drug use among
Tecumseh youth, one must read the Tenth Circuit appellate opinion very carefully. The
Circuit Court, both in text and footnotes, explains with exhaustive detail the lack of evidence
regarding drug use. Earls v. Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 of Pottawatomie
County, 242 F.3d 1264, 1272-74 (10th Cir. 2001). The Tenth Circuit majority challenges the
accuracy of the District Court record in footnote 9. Id. at 1274. In fact, the Court suggests
that:
some of these assertions [regarding drug use] involve distortions of the record in this case. For
instance, the "fourteen instances of drug usage" known to Dean Rogers include the following: in
1970, her daughter told her that an unidentified boy on the school bus had offered her some pills,
... one of her son's unidentified friends on the football team left a bag with drug paraphernalia
in it at her house.... in 1979, her son told her of "parties" he went to at which marijuana was
smoked .... in 1980, "[olne of the boys that ran with [her] son" was stopped and marijuana was
found in his car .... her daughter told her in 1972 or 1973 that the boyfriend of the girl with
whom she shared a locker sold drugs .... sometime in the middle 1980s a meter reader found
some marijuana near the meter at what is now a junior high school,. . . in the 1980s her grandson
told her that an unidentified student had a marijuana cigarette at school....
Id. n.9 (with additional double hearsay examples from Dean Rogers's relatives). Under the
appropriate federal standard for summary judgment, hearsay evidence, as is thoroughly cata-
logued in footnote nine, would be inadmissible to demonstrate that no genuine issue of mate-
rial fact exists. See FED. R. Civ. P. 56. Only those items that would be admissible as
testimony in federal court should be considered when resolving a Motion for Summary
Judgment.
233 See Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 of Pottawatomie County v. Earls, 122 S. Ct.
2559, 2567-68 (2002). Justice Thomas errantly relies upon the Court's earlier decision in
Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305 (1997), which struck down the attempted suspicionless
drug testing regime on adults to support his point that a demonstrated drug problem is unnec-
essary. In fact, Chandler stands for the very point that such ineffective attempts to test
individuals without warrant or suspicion just to detect and deter drug use is an invalid cir-
cumvention of the Fourth Amendment. Without presenting the minimal evidence proffered
by the School District in Earls, Justice Thomas simply asserts that "[t]he School District has
provided sufficient evidence to shore up the need for its drug testing program." Id.
234 The lack of any uncontroverted evidence regarding a drug problem at Tecumseh was the
primary reason that the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the District Court's grant of
summary judgment in favor of the school district. Earls v. Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist.
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on. Drug use, when it occurs at all among Tecumseh students, may occur
outside of school hours and far removed from school premises. Thus, it
becomes increasingly difficulty to justify the sacrifice of extracurricular oppor-
tunities to meet the speculative and symbolic need to deter drug use generally
among children.23 5 If the suspicionless drug test being adninistered by the
state is merely "symbolic," then past precedent indicates it cannot survive con-
236stitutional scrutiny.
For these reasons alone, Earls is a disturbing case. Earls is not loyal to
past precedent - either in the school context or under the "special needs" doc-
trine. 237 Further, from all outward signs, Earls provides the clear stepping
stone from T.L.O. 's system of lessened individual suspicion requirements for
searches at schools to Vernonia's suspicionless testing of athletes to the poten-
tial that all students attending public school may now be subject to random,
suspicionless drug testing at school without any evidence of an existing drug
problem at the school or proof that the testing furthers the legitimate govern-
mental interests of safety, order, and discipline. Simply put, the public school
itself has become the "special need."
Lest readers think that this commentary is simply the "slippery slope"
argument emanating from a dissatisfied court observer, it is important that law-
yers, students, and school officials alike look beyond the mere wording of the
Earls majority opinion. It is recommended that those tracking "special needs"
and education law cases read beyond the text of the opinion and study the
dialogue that resonated throughout oral argument in this case. Counsel for the
school district was clear in explaining that the Tecumseh policy was not
intended for disciplinary purposes or to "catch" students actually using drugs -
the main emphasis in T.L.O. - but rather "to deter drug use and help those
students. '2 38 General deterrent testing, standing alone, had not, prior to Earls,
successfully eviscerated any individual's Fourth Amendment rights.' 3 9
During oral argument, counsel for the school district explained that the
deterrent effect sought by the school district would effectively serve to deter
No. 92 of Pottawatomie County, 242 F.3d 1264, 1277-78 (10th Cir. 2001). The Tenth Cir-
cuit majority, relying on past precedent, surmised that "any district seeking to impose a
random suspicionless drug testing policy as a condition to participation in a school activity
must demonstrate that there is some identifiable drug abuse problem among a sufficient
number of those subject to the testing, such that testing that group of students will actually
redress its drug problem." Id. at 1278.
235 See e.g., id. at 2569 (Breyer, J., concurring) ("The drug problem in our Nation's schools
is serious in terms of size, the kinds of drugs being used, and the consequences of that use
both for our children and the rest of us.").
236 See generally Treasury Employees v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989) (Scalia, J., dis-
senting); Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 321-22 (1997).
237 See generally United Teachers of New Orleans v. Orleans Parish Sch. Bd., 142 F.3d
853, 857 (5th Cir. 1998) (reminding that "special needs must rest on demonstrated
realities").
238 Oral Argument, March 19, 2002, Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 of Pottawato-
mie County v. Earls, 122 S. Ct. 2559 (2002), at 13 (argument of Linda M. Meoli, Esq.,
Oklahoma City, OK, on behalf of Petitioners).
239 See e.g., City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32 (2000); Chandler v. Miller, 520
U.S. 305 (1997); Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67 (2001); and Vernonia Sch.
Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995). Each of these cases required some evidence of
actual drug use and refused to permit the tests to be employed for symbolic reasons.
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drug use among the general student body.24  The Court seemed very con-
cerned regarding what the evidence suggested: (1) that there was sparse, if any,
drug use among students; and (2) that there was even less indication that the
students participating in extracurricular activities were at a higher risk for drug
use than the general student body.24 ' This concern, one would expect, was
consistent with the Court's prior application of the "special needs" doctrine in
trying to determine whether - on balance - the need for testing outweighed the
need for individualized suspicion. 24 2 And, perhaps the most compelling sign
that the days of students' right to be free from suspicionless drug testing are
numbered, is the fact that the United States' Deputy Solicitor General explicitly
argued for the expansion of drug testing to all students. 24 3 At least one district
court has grappled with the question of whether a school-wide drug testing
policy contravenes the Fourth Amendment and, because the case preceded
Earls, struck down the policy as unconstitutional.
One of the problems in expanding suspicionless drug testing programs
within public schools is that such action contributes to the recently resurrected
concept of in loco parentis. Why should tax payers be burdened with any
additional expenditures to test students we do not suspect are using drugs in an
effort to dissuade children, generally, from turning to drugs and alcohol? Why
should the state substitute its action in an area where parents really are, and
should be, the first line of defense? If parents desire to drug test their children,
such tests are now readily available at local grocery stores, pharmacies and
supermarkets. And, at schools in Tecumseh and other districts, the utilization
240 Oral Argument, supra note 238. Although the Court tried to encourage counsel for
Petitioners to admit that such broad scale testing is the stepping stone to testing all students
in the general student body, counsel would only take the following bite at the carrot
proffered:
QUESTION: [by the Court] What I'm interested in and Justice Ginsburg was a moment ago is it
seems to me that if - if we take your argument and we take the evidence that is indicated on the
record, there is at least an equally good argument for testing everybody in the school, whether
they go out for band or whatnot or - or do not. And - and isn't that the case? That's what we're
interested in.
MS. MEOLI: [counsel for Petitioners] Well, I think there is a reasonably good argument for that.
We're not espousing that ....
Id. at 14.
241 Id. at 20 (referencing the Amicus Brief submitted by the American Academy of Pediat-
ics et al., proffering information regarding student drug use. The Court noted that this
Amicus Brief "pointed out that students that engage in these extracurricular activities are,
indeed, the least likely to be involved in drug use. And it seems so odd to try to penalize
those students and leave untested the students that are most apt to be engaged in the prob-
lem."). Id.
242 Id. at 14-15.
But if we get to that point [where no evidence of drug use and the fit between testing and use is
clear], then the whole notion of special need has - has, more or less, evaporated. We don't have
the kind of special safety need as - as in the railroad case. We don't have the unusual temptation
to crime need as in the immigration case, and the special need is simply the need to deter drug
use among all children in all schools of the United States. And - and if the - if the theory of this
is special need, it seems to me that the concept of special need seems to have gotten lost.
Id.
243 Id. at 25-26 (suggesting that if the only consequence of a positive drug test included the
confidential notification of parents, the United States does not believe that such a regime
would offend the Fourth Amendment).
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of drug-sniffing canines, locker searches, and suspicion-based searches have
successfully kept drug use to a minimum.2 44
Another issue, not squarely dealt with by the Court, is how much informa-
tion will be compelled by the school to complete the drug testing. Our urine
reveals much about us - whether we are diabetic, pregnant, under lawful medi-
cation or using illegal substances. The privacy rights all individuals maintain
in shielding medical conditions, such as hypertension or pregnancy, from the
state should not be so quickly or carelessly disregarded. It would have been
preferable for the majority to assure its audience that special care must be taken
not to reveal existing medical conditions to a child's teachers or coaches. In
some instances, such as those where the child has a condition that requires
communication to others or where the parents have had their child designated
as "disabled" under the IDEA statute, this concern is inherently less trouble-
some. But, in those remaining instances where latent medical conditions are
involuntarily revealed to the state through a suspicionless drug test, we should
be hesitant to give our constitutional stamp of approval. Such revelations,
under a state-mandated testing scheme that is not invoked through the tradi-
tional Fourth Amendment requirements, should be severely limited. Otherwise,
what was initially intended as a method of deterring illicit drug use among
teens can be relied upon to detect or deter other teenage societal problems, such
as pregnancy.
In addition, the "efficacy" of the Tecumseh policy should be improved - if
not under the pure "special needs" formula, at least from a more practical
standpoint. The majority opinion in Earls conveniently avoided mention of the
fact that the main culprit in Tecumseh schools - alcohol - is not a substance
that the policy's drug test detects. While illicit drug use poses great risks to
children, the abuse of alcohol and cigarettes remains a national problem among
children and adults alike. If schools are going to invest the resources, both
financial and otherwise, to educate and guide our children on healthy living
patters, then such obvious vices as alcohol and cigarette smoking should also
be discouraged. In recent years, the medical costs associated with tobacco use
have cost many lives and many dollars. To think that we can deter destructive
behavior by focusing only on certain illegal substances is terribly misguided.2 45
But again, such education may best be served by requiring parents to act appro-
priately in their role as parents. One cannot help but question whether the
modem impetus toward greater and greater state control over students' behav-
ior, both on and off campus, is an admission on the failing nature of our soci-
ety's parenting skills.
244 In many respects, the resort to suspicionless drug testing in Tecumseh was unnecessary.
The school had already implemented other techniques, including use of a drug dog to keep
the school as drug free as possible. And, as the record reflects, these less intrusive methods
were largely successful. See Earls v. Bd. of Educ. of Tecumseh Pub. Sch. Dist., Indep. Sch.
Dist. No. 92 of Pottawatomie County, 242 F.3d 1264, 1267 (10th Cir. 2001).
245 See supra note 14 and accompanying text, detailing the drugs tested for under the
Tecumseh Policy.
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IV. CONCLUSION
"Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state and local govern-
ments. Compulsory school attendance laws and the great expenditures for education
both demonstrate our recognition of the importance of education to our democratic
society .... It is the very foundation of good citizenship .... Today it is a principal
instrument in awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing him for later pro-
fessional training, and in helping him to adjust normally to his environment. In these
days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he
is denied the opportunity of an education. Such an opportunity, where the state has
undertaken to provide it, is a right which must be made available on equal
terms."
246
The issue in Earls was straightforward: must a school provide evidence of
a safety danger or existing drug problem to permit wide-scale random, suspi-
cionless drug testing of all students participating in extracurricular activities in
order to come within the narrow exception of the "special needs" doctrine.
Perhaps the question presented was even more simplistic than that. Perhaps the
issue was whether the T.L.O. version of watering down the Fourth Amendment
due to the unique nature of the school environment could be extended and
transmogrified into suspicionless searches of school children when an impor-
tant social need - other than immediate physical danger - presents itself.247
The unfortunate answer, regardless of the phrasing of the question, was yes.
Or, as the title of this article suggests, the unfortunate reality is that students
rights have been shed and shred at the schoolhouse gate.
Post-Earls, if a student wants to "go out for the team," she relinquishes
her rights to be free from suspicionless drug testing. If a student wants to sing
in the choir, he must realize that his school may screen his urine for illicit
drugs, with or without evidence that his school has a drug problem or that he,
individually, might be suspected of using illegal substances. Public school stu-
dents cannot expect that the constitutional protections they learn in their civics
or government class will apply with equal force to them. Public school stu-
dents cannot expect that their constitutional rights will be evaluated with the
same scrutiny as those afforded to all others in society. Rather, public school
students will realize that they are at the mercy of the state to extend to them
only as much of the Fourth Amendment as the state desires.
When students volunteer for basketball or the academic team, a school can
assume that their dedication to training and competition put them at risk for
poor decisions. Only those who voluntarily choose to avoid all supervised
246 Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
247 While drug use and drug abuse among children presents an immediate social concern,
there was little evidence to suggest that children at the Tecumseh school were using or
abusing drugs. And, while it may seem illogical to require schools to set forth evidence of
such use and abuse prior to embarking on suspicionless testing, such evidence is more con-
sistent with both the "special needs" doctrine and the Fourth Amendment hallmark of indi-
vidualized suspicion. The fear or thought that some individual students may be using drugs
should not enable a school district to completely discount the traditional requirements for
Fourth Amendment searches. Particularly after the Supreme Court's holding in Chandler v.
Miller, it seems that we are applying two different standards to those suspected of using
drugs - one to adults and another, more stringent, to minors.
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activity at school will be free - for the time being - from sacrificing their
coveted right to invoke the protections of the Fourth Amendment. The cheer-
leader is now treated in a manner consistent with the local convict while the
school dreg maintains her Fourth Amendment guarantees.
Earls is a disconcerting precedent. It is a disconcerting precedent for stare
decisis. It is a disconcerting precedent for "symbolic" attempts to deter drug
use. It is a disconcerting precedent for "special needs" and education law
cases. But, most importantly, it is a disconcerting precedent for our children.
The unfortunate reality is that their public school educations will have likely
taught them to read. And, those that read the Fourth Amendment and the line
of "special needs" cases will undoubtedly feel betrayed. The special needs
doctrine that developed out of the school context has now been transformed.
Students no longer receive the benefit of a special needs balancing analysis or a
demand for a valid governmental interest when reaching into students' most
private matters - the school itself has become the special need.
